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LIBERTY, TRADE, AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: WHEN SHOULD DEFAULT RULES BE BASED ON
BUSINESS PRACTICES?
KERRY LYNN MACINTOSH*
The last several years have been a time of revision and renew-
al for the Uniform Commercial Code (the "Code," UCC) and its
drafters. The American Law Institute (ALI) and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
have added two entirely new articles,' extensively revised four
others,2 and presently are redrafting two more.'
* Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A. 1978,
Pomona College; J.D. 1982, Stanford University.
Thanks are due to Professor Arthur Travers of the University of Colorado
School of Law, and Professors June Carbone and Leslie Griffin of Santa Clara Uni-
versity School of Law, for their valuable suggestions. I also thank Justin Hovey, J.D.
1997, Renee Lacey, J.D. 1996, Tom Benda, J.D. 1995, and Traci Sunderland, J.D.
1995, Santa Clara University School of Law, for their outstanding research assis-
tance.
1. Article 2A, which governs leases of goods, was added to the official text of
the Code in 1987, and was amended in 1990. Every state has enacted Article 2A,
except Connecticut, Louisiana, and South Carolina. See American Bar Association,
Commercial Law Newsletter, UCC Scorecard (March 1997) [hereinafter "UCC Score-
card 1997"]. Article 4A, which regulates funds transfers was added in 1989, and has
been adopted in every state. See American Bar Association, Commercial Law News-
letter, UCC Scorecard (June 1996).
2. Extensive revisions to Articles 3 (Negotiable Instruments) and 4 (Bank De-
posits and Collections) were completed in 1990. Since then, every state except Mas-
sachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, and South Carolina has enacted the revisions
into law. UCC Scorecard 1997, supra note 1.
In 1994, Article 8 (Investment Securities) was revised and reissued in a new
Official Text. More recently, the Al and NCCUSL completed a thorough revision of
Article 5 (Letters of Credit) in 1995. Although relatively new, these revised Articles
already have been enacted in many states. See id.
3. The Al and NCCUSL are working on extensive revisions to Articles 2
(Sales of Goods) and 9 (Secured Transactions). For a sampling of literature on the
revision process, see Gall Hillebrand, The Redrafting of UCC Articles 2 and 9: Model
Codes or Model Dinosaurs? 28 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 191 (1994); Howard Ruda, Article 9
Works-How Come? 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 309 (1994); Richard E. Speidel, Article 2
and Relational Sales Contracts, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 789 (1993); Symposium: The
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These new and revised articles reflect a strong trend toward
choosing default rules4 that codify existing business practices.5
This is particularly true of the recent revisions to Articles 3 (Ne-
gotiable Instruments), 4 (Bank Deposits and Collections) and 5
(Letters of Credit).
At first glance, this trend may seem unremarkable; after all,
scholars have long suggested that Karl Llewellyn, the principal
draftsman of Article 2, intended the Code as a codification of
business practices-a simple reaffirmation of the "morals of the
marketplace."' However, consumer advocates have protested
Revision of Az-ticle 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1299
(1994); James J. White, Revising Article 9 To Reduce Wasteful Litigation, 26 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 823 (1993).
4. In this Article, the term "default rules" refers to legal rules that fill the gaps
in incomplete contracts. Contracting parties have the freedom to contract around de-
fault rules. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989). For example, the
parties to a contract for the sale of goods can disclaim implied warranties and ex-
clude consequential damages. See U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-719(3) (1995).
By contrast, "immutable rules" are those that parties cannot change by
agreement. See Ayres & Gertner, supra, at 87. Returning to the foregoing example,
the parties to a contract for the sale of goods cannot exclude consequential damages
when it would be unconscionable'to do so. Limitation of consequential damages for
injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable.
See U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
5. In this Article, the term "business practices" is used to refer to practices
that emerge over time as countless market participants exercise their freedom to en-
gage in profitable transactions. For an account of the evolution of business practices,
see infra Part II. As used here, "business practices" is broader and less technical
than "trade usage," which the Code narrowly defines as "any practice or method of
dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to jus-
tify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in ques-
tion." U.C.C. § 1-205(2).
6. See, e.g., Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 626-29 (1975). According to Professor Danzig,
the Code assumes that ethical "values have an objectively ascertainable existence and
near universal acceptance and thus can be judicially discovered." Id. at 629. He found
this assumption disturbing because it "confine[s] the impact of the law to a reaffirma-
tion of the predominant morals of the marketplace," id., and "encourages lawmakers to
see law . . . 'as a body of devices for the purposes of business instead of as a body of
means toward general social ends.'" Id. at 630 (quoting Roscoe Pound, The Call for a
Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 708 (1931)).
Professor Zipporah Wiseman has offered a somewhat different view of the Code
and of Llewellyn in her comprehensive study of the merchant rules found in Article
2. She acknowledged that Llewellyn advocated merchant reality as being an ideal
standard in an effort to endorse marketplace norms of speed and efficiency. See
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loudly the recent revisions and their probusiness orientation,'
sometimes to the point of jeopardizing legislative enactment.8
This controversy invites reexamination of the relationship be-
tween business practices and the default rules of the UCC.
Economists long have argued that contract and commercial
law should establish default rules reflecting what the parties
would have chosen if bargaining were costless.' As Professor
Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules,
100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 492 (1987). "His vision also encompassed a normative belief
that the law should encourage the better practices and control the worst abuses of
the market." Id; see also Ingrid M. Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl
Llewellyn's Attempt To Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law,
73 GEo. L.J. 1141, 1181 (1985) (arguing that Llewellyn designed sound, rational
commercial rules reflecting ideal, rather than actual, business conduct). As Professor
Wiseman conceded, many of Llewellyn's original proposals were rejected, perhaps
because merchants rebelled against Llewellyn's normative vision of "better" merchant
practices. See Wiseman, supra, at 471-72, 519-38. For her complete critique of
Danzig's views, see id., at 468-69 n.13.
In contrast to both Danzig and Wiseman, Professor Hal Scott has strongly dis-
puted the prevailing "conception that commercial law embodies the law merchant
and that the Uniform Commercial Code merely furnishes businessmen with a clear
statement of their rules." Hal S. Scott, The Risk Fixers, 91 HARV. L. REV. 737, 737
(1978). He argued that commercial legislation is regulatory in nature; it is designed
to change, rather than codify, existing allocations of risk. See id. at 738-39, 761-76.
7. See, e.g., Gail K. Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: A Consumer Perspective, 42 ALA. L. REV. 679 (1991); Kathleen Patchel,
Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons
from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993); Edward Rubin,
Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of Revis-
ing UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 743 (1993).
8. See infra notes 292-298 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
27 (2d ed. 1989); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 81-82 (3d ed. 1986);
cf. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 165 (1992) (stating that courts should ap-
ply default rules that reflect a hypothetical rational agreement between the contract-
ing parties).
More recently, Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner have asserted'that effi-
cient outcomes sometimes may be better achieved by imposing rules that the parties
would not choose: so-called "penalty" defaults that require a party with superior in-
formation to reveal that information during the bargaining process. See Ayres &
Gertner, supra note 4, at 98.
For an alternative account of default rules that does not rely on economic prin-
ciples, see Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual
Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992). Professor Barnett has argued that the common
law of contract should provide default rules that reflect the norms of fairness and
efficiency embodied within the "common sense" of the community. See id. at 906-11.
In his view, adoption of such "conventionalist7 default rules would have two advan-
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Mitchell Polinsky has explained, "[slince the parties would have
included contract terms that maximize their joint benefits net of
their joint costs-both parties can thereby be made better
off-this approach is equivalent to designing contract law ac-
cording to the efficiency criterion."0 Building on this tradition,
the drafters have argued that revised Articles 3, 4, and 5 reduce
transaction costs and make payment systems more efficient."
Consumer advocates have argued their case using similar eco-
nomic terms, but have concluded that the same revisions are not
efficient. 2
Although this economic debate has been informative in many
ways, it also has proven inconclusive." More importantly, the
economic debate has focused on the merit of specific rules that
are based on business practices, and not on the more general
question of whether business practices are an appropriate source
of commercial default rules, and if so, why.
This Article provides a normative account of the relationship
between business practices and the default rules of the UCC.
The thesis is that business practices are a legitimate source of
tages. First, conventional understandings provide the best evidence of any subjective,
tacit assumptions that the parties may have made while bargaining. See id. at 880-
81. Thus, conventionalist default rules conform most closely to the subjective agree-
ment of the parties. See id. at 874-85. Second, when parties are not equally knowl-
edgeable about contract law, a default rule that reflects the common sense expecta-
tion of the reasonably ignorant party gives the better-informed party incentive to
share his superior knowledge as necessary to contract out of the rule. See id. at
894-95. In this manner, conventionalist default rules reduce the incidence of subjec-
tive disagreement about terms not reflected in the parties' manifested assent. See id.
at 875, 885-94. Interestingly, Professor Barnett has identified trade usage and course
of dealing as possible sources of information regarding the common sense expecta-
tions of the community. See id. at 906-07.
10. POLINSKY, supra note 9, at 27. The word "efficiency" can be used in many
ways. For example, a situation is said to be pareto efficient or pareto optimal when
there is no change from that situation that can better one person's existence without
worsening another's. See id. at 7 n.4.
This Article is not intended as a formal exposition of economic principles. Ac-
cordingly, I follow Professor Polinsky's excellent example in choosing a more intuitive
definition for expositional simplicity: A situation will be termed "efficient" if its ag-
gregate benefits outweigh its aggregate costs. See id. at 7.
11. See infra Parts IV and V.
12. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Ar-
ticles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551 (1991).
13. See infra Part V.C.
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default rules, to the extent that those practices are the product
of free choice by market participants. In other words, default
rules should be based on business practices as a means of re-
specting individual liberty.
In developing this theory of commercial law, this Article rea-
sons by analogy to works of political philosophy. Part I explains
Robert Nozick's theory of the evolution of the minimal state.
Nozick has theorized that individuals in a state of nature will
exercise their liberty to develop voluntary protective associations
capable of protecting members against others who would threat-
en their lives, health, liberty, or property. 4 Emerging over
time, a dominant protective association may exercise a de facto
monopoly over the use of force, and have a moral obligation to
extend its services to individuals within its boundaries. 5 Thus,
a minimal state can arise through an "invisible hand" process. 6
Part II employs similar reasoning to develop a theoretical
model of commercial law. Individuals who enjoy freedom and
who own property will trade goods and services with each other,
and, across countless transactions, business practices will begin
to emerge. Individuals may choose to band together in voluntary
trade associations, enforcing contractual promises and relevant
business practices through a system of arbitration and private
sanctions. As a voluntary association comes to dominate a cer-
tain trade or geographical area, it will have the de facto power
to enforce arbitration decisions-and underlying business prac-
tices-against members and nonmembers alike. Through this
"invisible hand" process, business practices may come to ap-
proach the status of law.
Part III of this Article explores the policy implications of my
theoretical model of commercial law for the UCC. Drawing upon
Articles 1 and 2 of the Code, this Article documents several
ways in which the UCC codifies business practices. Then, rea-
soning by analogy to the theoretical model, I explain that exist-
ing business practices are generated when individuals use their
freedom of contract over the course of many commercial transac-
14. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 12-15 (1974).
15. See id. at 15-17.
16. See id. at 18-22.
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tions. Thus, when the Code adopts such business practices, it
respects the liberty of the individuals who helped to create those
practices. The Code further safeguards liberty by allowing indi-
viduals to agree to vary the effect of its default provisions.
Part IV furthers my theoretical model by applying it to specif-
ic developments that have occurred in letter of credit law. Both
the original and the revised Article 5 are based on letter of cred-
it practices that ensure operational efficiency. Such practices,
however, have more than economic benefits. They also embody
the free choices made by individual issuers, beneficiaries, and
applicants over many years and transactions. By incorporating
default rules based on letter of credit practices, revised Article 5
respects the liberty of issuers, beneficiaries, and applicants.
Finally, Part V examines controversial rules within revised
Articles 3 and 4 that affect the rights and obligations of banks
and their customers. In theory, checking account practices re-
flect the free choices of both banks and customers. Problems
arise, however, in applying this theory to consumer checking ac-
counts. Consumers lack the knowledge and power to bargain
effectively with banks, and have few alternative payment mech-
anisms available to them. Unfortunately, this lack of meaningful
choice within a significant segment of the market makes it hard
to justify the codification of checking account practices on liberty
grounds.
This Article concludes that liberty has important normative
implications for the content of commercial law. Often, business
practices embody principles of freedom. As a general rule, the
drafters should adopt business practices as law in order to re-
spect commercial judgment and protect free choice. Neverthe-
less, I recognize that this reasoning has limits. Practice-based
default rules are justifiable on liberty grounds only when affect-
ed individuals have a reasonable opportunity to participate in
the development of underlying practices. Too often, consumers
lack the knowledge and bargaining power necessary to partici-
pate in the evolution of consumer-friendly practices. Thus, the
drafters should be cautious in extending practice-based rules
beyond their commercial roots. The drafters should continue to
adopt business practices as the general framework for the Code,
but also should stand ready to carve out specific rules as neces-
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sary to accommodate consumer interests.
I. ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA
Some twenty years ago, Robert Nozick published his master-
work of political theory, Anarchy, State and Utopia.7 Arguing
that state of nature theory packs "explanatory punch and illumi-
nation," 8 Nozick expounded a theory of the state that owed
much to John Locke's Second Treatise of Government.9
Nozick began his analysis by repeating several of Locke's fun-
damental observations.2" The cornerstone of the Lockean state
of nature is the liberty of the individual. Individuals are in "a
state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of
their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the
bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending
upon the will of any other man."2' The bounds of nature impose
minimal restraints upon this liberty: "[No one ought to harm
another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions."22
Within the Lockean state of nature, each individual has the
right to enforce the law of nature: "[E]very one has a right to
17. NOZIcK, supra note 14. In more recent years, Nozick has questioned the ade-
quacy of the political philosophy that he presented in Anarchy, State and Utopia, at
least to the extent that it fails to address the importance of political action as a
symbolic expression of our social ties and concerns. See ROBERT NoZICK, THE EXAM-
INED LIFE 286-92 (1989) [hereinafter NOZICK, EXAMINED LIFE]; ROBERT NOZICK, THE
NATURE OF RATIONALITY 32 (1993). Nozick, however, has been careful to note that
these self-critical remarks are not intended as an alternative theory to the one that
he presented in Anarchy, State and Utopia. See NOZICK, EXAAENED LIFE, supra, at
287. More importantly, once a great work has been released into the marketplace of
ideas, it is difficult for anyone-even the author himself-to recall it. The logic, vi-
sion, and continuing popularity of Nozick's original work justifies its use here.
18. NOZICK, supra note 14, at 8-9. Nozick argued that a fundamental theory de-
scribing how a state would arise from a state of nature serves important explanato-
ry purposes, even if no actual state ever arose that way:
We learn much by seeing how the state could have arisen, even if it did-
n't arise that way. If it didn't arise that way, we also would learn much
by determining why it didn't; by trying to explain why the particular bit
of the real world that diverges from the state-of-nature model is as it is.
Id. at 9.
19. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (J.W. Gough ed., 1948) (1690).
20. See NOZICK, supra note 14, at 10.
21. LOCKE, supra note 19, § 4, at 4.
22. Id. § 6, at 5.
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punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may
hinder its violation."" When an individual enforces his own
rights, however, self-interest can lead to biased judgment and
disproportionate punishment.24 Moreover, execution of judg-
ment may be impossible for the weak, and difficult and danger-
ous even for the strong.' Because of such drawbacks, men will
abandon the absolute freedom found in a state of nature, prefer-
ring instead to unite in society to protect their lives, liberties,
and estates.2"
A. The Rise of Protective Associations
Working from these basic premises, Nozick theorized that in-
dividuals in a state of nature will form protective associa-
tions." These associations will provide services (including de-
tection of misdeeds and apprehension, adjudication, punishment,
and recovery of compensation from wrongdoers) that protect
members from each other and from outsiders." To discourage
private retaliation, associations will refuse protection against
counterretaliation launched by outsiders or other members.29
Over time, several different protective associations may arise
in the same geographical area."0 What happens when different
agencies reach different decisions? Nozick identified three possi-
bilities. First, when competing agencies engage in battle, one is
always stronger, and therefore, always wins."' Eventually the
losing agency falls apart, as clients leave to do business with the
winner. Second, different agencies do exist, but are located
within entirely separate geographical areas, so that little conflict
results.3 Third, competing agencies that fight evenly and often
23. Id. § 7, at 5-6; see also id. § 8, at 6 (arguing that the extent of proper pun-
ishment is that which is required for retribution and deterrence).
24. See id. §§ 124-125, at 62-63.
25. See id. § 127, at 63.
26. See id. § 123, at 62.
27. See NOZICK, supra note 14, at 12.
28. See id. at 13.
29. See id. at 15.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 16.
32. See id.
33. See id.
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create mechanisms to help resolve conflicting judgments, such as
separate jurisdictions, choice of law rules, or perhaps a unified
judicial system with appellate courts.3 4 "Out of anarchy,
pressed by spontaneous groupings, mutual-protection associa-
tions, division of labor, market pressures, economies of scale,
and rational self-interest there arises something very much
resembling a minimal state or a group of geographically distinct
minimal states."35
B. The Evolution of the Minimal State
Does this system of private protective associations actually
amount to a minimal state? Nozick defined the "ultraminimal"
state as being one that maintains a monopoly over all use of
force except that which is necessary for immediate self-defense,
thus excluding private retaliation." Protective associations ap-
parently will not exercise such complete control, because some
individuals ("independents") can refuse to join such agencies.3 7
These independents then will administer their own procedures
of justice, adjudicating and exacting punishment for violations of
their natural rights." Nozick reasoned, however, that a protec-
tive association legitimately can defend its clients against unreli-
able procedures of justice-those which are too likely to punish
34. See id.
35. Id. at 16-17.
36. See id. at 26. Locke also identified as a key attribute of the state the ability
to hold a monopoly over the use of force:
Man ... hath by nature a power not only to preserve his property-that
is, his life, liberty, and estate-against the injuries and attempts of other
men, but to judge of and punish the breaches of that law in others as he
is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where
the heinousness of the fact in his opinion requires it. But because no
political society can be nor subsist without having in itself the power to
preserve the property, and, in order thereunto, punish the offences of all
those of that society, there, and there only, is political society, where ev-
ery one of the members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up
into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from
appealing for protection to the law established by it.
LOCKE, supra note 19, § 87, at 42-43.
37. See NOZICK, supra note 14, at 54.
38. See id. at 54-55.
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the innocent or overpunish the guilty. 9 The association also
can object when independents attempt to administer unknown
procedures of justice that have not been shown to be reliable
and fair.41 If a protective association is dominant within a par-
ticular geographical area,41 its power will allow it to occupy a
unique position.42 This dominant association will have so much
power that it freely can prohibit any procedures that it deter-
mines to be defective. 43 Thus, even if a protective association
does not have a de jure monopoly on the use of force, its domi-
nant position can give it a de facto monopoly that no indepen-
dent would dare to challenge."
Nozick's work acknowledged that the dominant protective as-
sociation does not have absolute control over the use of force-if
one independent enforces justice against another, and both are
satisfied with the procedure employed, the dominant association
has no right to intervene.45 According to Nozick, however, this
limitation does not preclude the possibility that the dominant
protective association is a state, because citizens can, and do,
choose to opt out of a state's judicial apparatus, thus acting as
independents.46
Nozick's theory includes defining the minimal state as the
"night-watchman state of classical liberal theory, limited to the
functions of protecting all its citizens against violence, theft, and
fraud, and to the enforcement of contracts."47 To move beyond
the ultraminimal state and achieve the minimal state, the state
must provide protection for every person living within its geo-
graphical boundaries.48 Private protective associations seeming-
39. See id. at 88, 101.
40. See id. at 102. The person seeking to enforce his procedure of justice need
only provide information sufficient to show that the procedure is reliable and fair.
See id. The consent of the protective association to the administration of justice
(which could be withheld arbitrarily) is not required. See id. at 101.
41. See id. at 16.
42. See id. at 108.
43. See id. at 108-09.
44. See id. at 109.
45. See id. at 109-10.
46. See id. at 110.
47. Id. at 26.
48. See id. at 26-27.
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ly are obliged to provide services only to those who pay for pro-
tection.49 Nozick theorized, however, that once the dominant
protective association has prohibited independents from enforc-
ing their own "unreliable" procedures of justice, the indepen-
dents will be unable to protect themselves from harm, and thus
will become disadvantaged in their daily activities and lives.5"
Because some independents could have carried out their own
brand of justice without violating anyone's rights, the members
of the dominant protective association will be morally obligated
to compensate independents for these disadvantages.5' Nozick
further theorized that dominant associations can compensate in-
dependents at the least cost to themselves by supplying protec-
tive services against their own clients.52 When an independent
cannot afford such protective services, the members of the domi-
nant association must make up the difference between the mon-
etary costs of independent enforcement, and the cost of an ade-
quate protective policy.53
Through this course of reasoning, Nozick offered what he (fol-
lowing Adam Smith) termed an "invisible hand" explanation of
the rise of the minimal state.54 Self-interested and rational per-
sons acting in a Lockean state of nature form protective
agencies, which, over time, come to dominate geographical terri-
tories, and assume de facto monopoly over the use of force, with-
out conscious intent.55 From this ultraminimal state, a minimal
state can emerge, when members of the dominant protective as-
sociation honor their moral obligation to provide independents
with protective services.55 Because the dominant protective as-
49. See id. at 24-25.
50. See id. at 110.
51. Nozick based this conclusion on his separately derived principle of compensa-
tion. See id. at 78-79, 81-84. According to this principle, those who prohibit acts that
involve risk-but actually might have turned out to be harmless-must compensate
affected persons for the disadvantages imposed upon them by the prohibition. See id.
at 82-83. A complete explanation of how Nozick derived this principle is beyond the
scope of this Article, but can be found in id at 78-87.
52. See id. at 110.
53. See id. at 110-12.
54. For Nozick's explanation of the term "invisible hand," see id. at 18-22.
55. See id. at 118.
56. See id. at 119.
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sociation asserts a monopoly on force within its territory, and
has an obligation to protect everyone within its borders, it satis-
fies the two crucial conditions for being a minimal state.5"
II. LIBERTY, TRADE, AND COMMERCIAL LAW
Although Nozick's work belongs within the realm of political
philosophy, his theoretical account of the spontaneous rise of the
minimal state resonates with historical accounts of the sponta-
neous evolution of the law merchant,58 the distant ancestor of
the UCC.59 In brief, as trade increased during the eleventh cen-
tury, merchants began to develop common business practices
that facilitated their profitable trade. At first, these practices
were localized, but over time, as transregional trade increased,
merchants began to carry their practices from region to re-
gion.6" Practices that were consistently observed, and that pro-
moted trade most effectively, spontaneously evolved into
transregional, and sometimes transnational, rules of conduct.6'
Disputes were resolved in speedy, informal arbitration proceed-
ings refereed by fellow merchants.62 This system was self-en-
forcing; those who did not comply with a judgment not only
risked their reputation, but also could be excluded or boycotted
from trading in certain markets."
57. Id. at 118-19.
58. "Law merchant" or "lex mercatoria" is a term used to describe those rules
encompassing the trading practices of the international merchant community. See Mi-
chael T. Medwig, Note, The New Law Merchant: Legal Rhetoric and Commercial Re-
ality, 24 LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 589, 590 (1993). Here, I use the term in an histor-
ical sense, to refer to medieval trading practices.
59. For an account of historical developments from the medieval law merchant to
the UCC, see Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55
S. ECON. J. 644, 646-56 (1989). The drafters of the UCC have acknowledged that the
Code is "in large part a reformulation and restatement of the law merchant and of
the understanding of a business community which transcends state and even nation-
al boundaries." U.C.C. § 1-105 cmt. 3 (1995).
60. See LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT- THE EVOLUTION OF COMMER-
CiAL LAw 8 (1983).
61. See id. at 11; Benson, supra note 59, at 648.
62. See Benson, supra note 59, at 650; Christoph W.O. Stoecker, The Lex Merca-
toria: To What Extent Does It Exist?, 7 J. INT'L ARB., Mar. 1990, at 101, 102-03.
63. See Benson, supra note 59, at 649; Bernardo M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn,
The New Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonization of the Laws of International Com-
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Inspired by this history of the spontaneous evolution of the
law merchant, this Article adapts Nozick's state-of-nature theory
to develop parallel theory of the rise of commercial law.' Mov-
ing beyond historical accounts of the law merchant, this Article
identifies liberty as the foundation of a spontaneously evolved
commercial law. Later, this Article uses this theory as a model
by which to assess actual developments in the UCC.
A. The Rise of Business Practices and Trade Associations
Through the mechanism of free trade, individuals can exercise
their "perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their
possessions and persons as they think fit."' A person who owns
desirable goods or services can sell them to others, in exchange
for goods, services, or (eventually) a common medium of ex-
change. Ultimately, individuals will realize that a variety of cir-
cumstances-such as the nature of their products, location of
trading partners, transportation needs, and evolving technolo-
gy-affect the structure and profitability of their deals. Each
rational individual will exercise his or her freedom to select con-
tractual solutions that maximize profit, often by minimizing
transaction costs.6" Over time, and with repeated transactions,
patterns will emerge within trades. Words within particular
trades assume common meanings, which minimize costly misun-
derstandings. 7 Moreover, efficient delivery and transportation
practices arise, risks are allocated to persons best able to mini-
mize them,68 and remedies that redress breach without signifi-
cantly disrupting continuing trade relationships become estab-
lished as usage. Such practices are not static; as circumstances
mercial Transactions, 2 B.U. INTL L.J. 317, 319 (1984); Stoecker, supra note 62, at 103.
64. At this point in the Article, the objective is only to provide a theoretical ac-
count, not to assert that modem commercial law has, in fact, evolved from a state
of nature.
65. LOCKE, supra note 19, § 4, at 4.
66. See generally POSNER, supra note 9, at 82-85.
67. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Con-
tracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757, 787 (1995) (outlining the evolutionary process of testing,
interpretation, and adjustment of certain contract forms through which the uncer-
tainty of the forms is reduced).
68. See generally POSNER, supra note 9, at 91-94.
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change and new problems arise, individuals (including those
newly arrived in the world of trade) will exercise their liberty to
develop new agreements and new practices, always taking profit
as their lodestar. Any custom that does not facilitate commercial
transactions should fall quickly by the wayside, to be superseded
by more profitable practices.
In this manner, business practices arise as the product of eco-
nomic goals, chosen as the most efficient means of allowing indi-
viduals to engage in profitable transactions. 9 More fundamen-
tally, however, such business practices are the product of liberty,
exercised by many individuals over many years and many trans-
actions. Without freedom, individuals could not develop rational
business practices in the pursuit of profit.7 ° When one looks at
a business practice, one sees the reflection, the echo, of individu-
al choices made over time. Business practices, as the products of
liberty, have an inherent moral legitimacy.
Before continuing this analysis, it is necessary to confront and
resolve one possible distinction between the political realm that
Nozick envisioned and the commercial world addressed in this
Article. When Nozick spoke of "individuals" who exercise their
natural rights to evolve the minimal state, he meant natural
persons-that is, human beings. Of course, many actors in the
commercial world are natural persons, doing business alone or
in partnership with each other. The commercial world, however,
also involves "persons" who are not human beings, such as cor-
porations and banks. Assertions that corporations do not have
natural rights are abundant;"' probably such claims derive
69. Cf Amy H. Kastely, Stock Equipment for the Bargain in Fact: Trade Usage,
"Express Terms," and Consistency Under § 1-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
64 N.C. L. REV. 777, 800 (1986) (stating that fair trade practices "frequently repre-
sent efficient ways to handle . . .problems"); Medwig, supra note 58, at 592 (noting
that medieval law merchant embodied practices "that best promoted commerce and
prosperity").
70. Milton Friedman has argued passionately and persuasively that economic
freedom is an indispensable means by which to achieve political freedom. MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-21 (1982). Here, I make the converse point:
Political freedom (as embodied in natural rights of liberty) is a prerequisite and
foundation of economic freedom.
71. See 6 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2476 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1996); MICHIE ON BANKS AND
BANKING, ch. 2, § 1 (1986) ("A banking corporation is wholly a creation of statute,
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from nineteenth century corporate theory, which envisioned the
corporation as an artificial entity owing its very existence to the
state.72 Modern corporate theory, however, teaches that a cor-
poration is nothing more than a "nexus of contracts" formed be-
tween shareholders, managers, employees, creditors, suppliers,
and customers.73 According to this view, even if a corporation
as such does not have natural rights, the human beings who act
through the device of the corporation retain the natural rights
held by all human beings.74 Thus, even when some individuals
choose to associate and transact business through the corporate
form, the practices that evolve from free contracting remain
grounded in a natural right to liberty.
So far, this discussion has assumed a somewhat amorphous
commercial world, one in which individuals do business with
other individuals, linked only by their involvement in a common
trade. Eventually, however, businesspersons, particularly those
who work in the same industry, might choose to band together
in voluntary trade associations. These associations can serve a
variety of purposes: shaping and standardizing business
practices into trade codes; exchanging information about supply
doing business by legislative grace, and the right to carry on banking business
through the ... corporation ... is dependent on the grant of corporate powers by
the state.").
72. As one author has explained, "critics of corporations use this 'entity' idea in
asserting that corporations have no rights. Rights, after all, apply to individuals or
groups of individuals (such as partnerships) but not to imaginary 'entities'." Robert
Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private Property Model, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1327, 1328 (1979). For an historical account of the artificial entity theo-
ry, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Per-
spectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989); Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising
the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061 (1994).
73. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Du-
ties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLTM. L. REV. 1416
(1989); Hessen, supra note 72, at 1330; Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the
American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983).
For a critique of "nexus of contracts" theory, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The
"lNexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407
(1989); Phillips, supra note 72, at 1090-97, 1111-13. Despite such criticism, the
"nexus of contracts" theory generally is acknowledged as the dominant legal theory
of the corporation today. See Phillips, supra note 72, at 1061.
74. See Hessen, supra note 72, at 1330.
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and demand needs; providing an informal network for the dis-
cussion of ways by which to improve goods and services; creating
new ways of effecting payment and extending credit;75 and, per-
haps most significantly, establishing mechanisms such as arbi-
tration to resolve disputes between members.76 Arbitral awards
can be enforced through a variety of sanctions, ranging from
damage to business reputation to expulsion from the trade asso-
ciation (and thus exclusion from its benefits) and possibly trade
boycott.77
Most disputes between association members presumably will
involve enforcement of a commercial agreement. Does a volun-
tary trade association have the right to enforce such
75. Medieval legal history offers some fine examples of merchant-evolved pay-
ment and credit devices. For example, as commerce increased during the 13th and
14th centuries, Italian merchants invented the contract of cambium, a contract to
transport and exchange the currency of one country for another. See WILLIAM E.
BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 4 (1943). From this humble
beginning, merchants developed the bill of exchange (known in modern terms as the
draft). See id. at 5. To illustrate the benefits of the bill of exchange, suppose A
wanted to purchase goods or services from B, who was located in a distant land.
Rather than send cash that could be stolen en route, A could purchase and send a
bill of exchange from his local bank that would order a correspondent bank in the
correct location to pay B. In this manner, the bill of exchange facilitated commerce
by serving as an effective payment system. See CHARLES P. NORTON, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 1-6 (2d ed. 1896).
76. See Cremades & Plehn, supra note 63, at 325.
77. See Benson, supra note 59, at 657. Once again, this description of voluntary
trade associations is intended to serve only as a theoretical model. Within the real
world, some of the activities described above could, under certain conditions, violate
sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994), and/or state antitrust
and unfair competition laws. For example, the imposition of an association's stan-
dardized contract terms on unwilling customers could amount to an illegal concerted
refusal to deal. See Paramount Famous Lasky v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930);
United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 789 n.12 (7th
Cir. 1981). Competitors who exchange information must take care, lest their actions
be used as evidence of an illegal agreement to fix prices or limit production. See,
e.g., United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir.
1987); Northern Cal. Pharm. Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1962).
Last, but certainly not least, trade association policies that exclude competitors from
membership, expel members for failure to comply with association rules, or use boy-
cotts as punishment for noncomplying members, may be characterized as illegal
group-boycotts under certain circumstances. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc.
v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985); Silver v. N.Y.S.E., 373
U.S. 341 (1963); Associated Press Co. v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
LIBERTY, TRADE, AND UCC
agreements? If, as Locke suggested, every individual has a right
to punish another who injures his liberty,"5 then individual
members should be able to assign their enforcement rights to
the association. Why does enforcement of commercial agree-
ments vindicate liberty? As Professor Charles Fried explained,
the convention of promising maximizes individual autonomy. By
committing to particular courses of action, individuals can par-
ticipate in the projects of others who must depend upon their
future conduct. 9 Applying this reasoning to a hypothetical vol-
untary trade association, the convention of promising serves to
increase the freedom of association members who thereby are
enabled to participate in profitable transactions with other mem-
bers who, in turn, must rely upon their future conduct. Broken
promises threaten not only the liberty of affected promisees (who
are left without any means of effectuating their plans), but also
the liberty of other association members, who may lose confi-
dence in the very convention of promising.0 Accordingly, by en-
forcing the promises contained within commercial agreements,
the association vindicates the liberty interests of its members.
In the absence of state-made law, what norms should govern
contractual disputes between members of a voluntary trade as-
sociation? First, as explained above, when a member makes and
breaks a promise to another member, the association may en-
force the specific promise made. Second, when express promises
are unclear, or do not address the dispute at hand, voluntary
trade associations may recognize relevant business practices as
being implied terms within a specific agreement, or (taking the
analysis one step further), fashion those practices into generally
applicable norms. The use of business practices to resolve dis-
putes is consistent with the liberty of members, who freely
choose to join the association and follow its rules. Moreover, as
78. See LOCKE, supra note 19, § 7, at 5-6.
79. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 13-14 (1981). Although promising
may seem to restrict autonomy, the restrictions involved in promising increase future
options and thus are consistent with the principle of autonomy. See id. at 14.
80. Cf. Kerry L. Macintosh, Gilmore Spoke Too Soon: Contract Rises from the
Ashes of the Bad Faith Tort, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 483, 522 (1994) (explaining that
pervasive breach of contract undermines the institution of promise, thereby decreas-
ing the autonomy of promisors and promisees).
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explained above, the business practices themselves are created
when countless individuals exercise their freedom to order their
own lives and property. Thus, a decision to use business practic-
es to resolve disputes respects the freedom of the individuals
who create those standards-many of whom may be members of
the association.
Suppose a business conflict arises between members of differ-
ent trade associations-each of which apply different practices
and reach different outcomes. What then? Following Nozick,s'
three scenarios are possible. First, assuming that one trade as-
sociation is much more successful (profitable) than the other,
and that both are doing business in the same trade and geo-
graphical area, conflicts of this kind may recede on their own, as
traders leave the weaker association to do business with the
more profitable group. Members of the more successful (and
now-dominant) trade association will use their own freely-devel-
oped business practices to resolve intra-association disputes.
In the second scenario, many potential conflicts are avoided
entirely because different associations ply different trades, or
are active within different geographic areas. Within its own area
or trade, each association reigns supreme, again implementing
its own voluntary system of practices and usages.
The third, and most challenging, scenario assumes that trade
associations remain in conflict, perhaps because each serves the
same geographic area and trade. In these cases, .members of
competing trade associations might agree upon some method of
resolving inevitable conflicts. Each group may agree to assume
jurisdiction over certain categories of dispute, or the groups can
jointly adopt a unified system to resolve inter-association dis-
putes. Either solution reflects the right of individual members to
freely order and dispose of their persons and property-in this
case, through the development of mechanisms that resolve dis-
putes and thereby facilitate profitable business transactions.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 27-57.
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B. The Evolution of Commercial Law
Nozick, in developing a state-of-nature theory of the state,
asked whether a system of private protective associations
amounts to a minimal state." Reasoning by analogy, consider a
somewhat different question: Does a private association that uses
business practices to resolve disputes create commercial "law?"
Interestingly, this question echoes an ongoing debate over the
true nature of the modern law merchant. Several commentators
have argued that the law merchant is best understood as an au-
tonomous body of law.83 Others have asserted vigorously that
the law merchant can never be "law" as such, contending that
international trade practice and custom must be relegated to the
status of principia mercatoria, business principles, at best.'
A complete investigation of the nature of law, or the law mer-
chant, is beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, the same
jurisprudential theories that international scholars have used to
assess the law merchant are relevant to this discussion because
they help to determine whether the spontaneously evolved busi-
ness practices described in this theoretical model can be fairly
characterized as "law."
The jurisprudence of positivism assumes that national law is
based on the will of the sovereign state, and that international
law derives from the wills of many sovereign states." Thus,
some commentators argue that the law merchant as such can
never be law, because it represents nothing more than the com-
mon understanding of the international trading community.8
82. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Benson, supra note 59, at 660-61; Harold J. Berman & Felix J.
Dasser, The "New" Law Merchant and the 'Old": Sources, Content, and Legitimacy,
in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT
21, 21 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1990); Berthold Goldman, Lex Mercatoria,
FORUM INTERNATIONALE, Nov. 1983, at 3; Aleksander Goldstajn, The New Law Mer-
chant, 1961 J. BUS. L. 12, 12 (cited in Medwig, supra note 58, at 589); Friedrich K.
Juenger, The Lex Mercatoria and the Conflict of Laws, in LEX MERCATORIA AND AR-
BITRATION-A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 213, 214-18, 222-24 (Thomas
E. Carbonneau ed., 1990). See generally Medwig, supra note 58.
84. See, e.g., Keith Highet, The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L. REV.
613, 628 (1989); Stoecker, supra note 62, at 124-25.
85. See Medwig, supra note 58, at 614-15.
86. See Berman & Dasser, supra note 83, at 22; Stoecker, supra note 62, at 107-
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Other jurisprudential theories, however, are flexible enough to
accommodate the notion of the law merchant as law. For exam-
ple, commentators have argued that the law merchant could be
recognized as the product of natural law, because parties to in-
ternational trade contracts are and should be free to conclude
contracts based on the overriding principles of bona fides and
pacta sunt servanda and on their own will." Applying this
same reasoning to the theoretical model presented in this Arti-
cle, the business practices generated when individuals exercise
their right to liberty similarly can be recognized as the product
of natural law.
Moving beyond general jurisprudential theories to specific
characteristics of "law," international scholars have argued that
the law merchant must be enforceable in order to qualify as
law.88 Again, reasoning by analogy, a voluntary trade associa-
tion may resolve disputes between members by enforcing con-
tractual promises and related norms based on business practic-
es. The association can enforce its arbitral awards through a
system of private sanctions (damage to reputation, expulsion,
boycott), thereby creating a privately designed justice system
that operates within the association.89
Positivists (those who insist that the state is the only source
of true law) may argue that arbitration awards are meaningless
without the ultimate threat of enforcement by the state."
08, 118; Medwig, supra note 58, at 614-15.
87. See Berman & Dasser, supra note 83, at 28-29. Bona fides and pacta sunt
servanda denominate the principles of good. faith and adherence to mutual
agreement. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 176, 1109 (6th ed. 1990).
88. See, e.g., Highet, supra note 84, at 624; Stoecker, supra note 62, at 105.
89. See Benson, supra note 59, at 656-67.
90. See, e.g., Highet, supra note 84, at 620; Stoecker, supra note 62, at 105.
Currently, the United States enforces both domestic and international arbitral
awards. The Federal Arbitration Act provides that written provisions for arbitration
of future controversies in contractual transactions involving commerce or maritime
transactions are to be held "valid, irrevocable and enforceable." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
The federal courts have the power to enforce arbitration agreements by affirming ar-
bitral awards. See id. § 9. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act preempts any state law that would undermine the enforcement
of an arbitration agreement. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
In addition, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 251, 7 U.N.T.S. 330, has been implemented
in the United States. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208. The Convention, which specifically
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Even if voluntary trade associations must count on the state to
help execute some disputed awards, private sanction can effec-
tively encourage compliance in other cases. Also, where one
association becomes so dominant within a geographical area or
trade that private sanctions weigh particularly heavily upon
disobedient members, enforcement may approach near-optimal
levels. Thus, just as Nozick's dominant protective association
could possibly exercise a de facto monopoly on force,91 a domi-
nant trade association may enjoy a de facto power to enforce its
own arbitral awards-and, by extension, the decisional norms
on which those awards are based. In this manner, the business
practices generated under my theoretical model can acquire a
near-legal status.92
As a voluntary trade association becomes more dominant, non-
members (independents) who wish to engage in profitable trade
will have fewer alternatives to contracting with members of the
association. Thus, when a member of a dominant trade associa-
tion does business with an independent, the member may have
enough bargaining power to insist that the independent agree to
arbitrate disputes pursuant to the dominant association's rules.
In this way, the business practices recognized within the domi-
nant trade association may come to be enforced beyond its im-
mediate membership.
What happens when disputes arise between independents? If
two independents ply the same trade as do members of the dom-
inant trade association, they already may follow similar practices.
If, however, the dominant trade association consciously choos-
es to adapt and improve existing practices, subtle but important
changes, or even an independent trade code may result. Then,
because association practices do not apply to disputes between
encompasses the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, was implemented in order
to "encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements
in international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbi-
trate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries."
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
91. See NOZICK, supra note 14, at 16.
92. Cf. Berman & Dasser, supra note 83, at 32; Cremades & Plehn, supra note
63, at 329, 333; Goldman, supra note 83, at 20-22 (stating that the lex mercatoria
constitutes a form of law, even though the state serves as the ultimate source of en-
forcement).
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independents, those practices lack general applicability," an-
other key attribute of law according to law merchant scholars. 4
Persons engaged in similar transactions, in the same trade and
in the same geographical area, will be subject to entirely differ-
ent rules when conflicts arise. Because another key attribute of
law is fairness5 5 -and because fairness under the law often re-
quires that like things be treated alike9 -- lack of uniform appli-
cation is a difficult problem to surmount. Once again, however,
Nozick's political reasoning offers lessons for the commercial
realm. Perhaps independents can choose to opt out of the "law"
established by the dominant trade association-just as citizens
are (often) free to reject statutory provisions in favor of alterna-
tive contractual solutions." This argument gains in force as the
dominant trade association gains power and members. The few-
er independents left outside the association, the more universal,
and therefore more law-like, the association's business practices
become.
Returning one last time to law merchant scholarship as a
source of information and inspiration, some scholars question
whether the law merchant is accessible, clear, consistent, com-
plete, and predictable enough to qualify as 'law.""8 Other schol-
ars, however, question the degree to which these qualities must
be established before a set of concepts, standards, principles,
rules, procedures, and institutions can be said to constitute
law.9 They point out that even statutes and case precedents
(both of which are undeniably "law") are all too often inaccessi-
93. Cf. Stoecker, supra note 62, at 124-25 ("Due to the constantly changing
methods, the number of tradesmen being part of this community and the geograph-
ically different understanding of how business is to be performed, the lex mercatoria is
too uncertain a set of rules to be regarded as a law that is binding for everyone.").
94. See, e.g., Berman & Dasser, supra note 83, at 26-27; Highet, supra note 84, at 624.
95. See Highet, supra note 84, at 624.
96. See generally Note, Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1065, 1163-65 (1969).
97. See NOZICK, supra note 14, at 110. For example, the effect of UCC provisions
may be varied by agreement, except as provided otherwise, and except that obliga-
tions of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care may not ever be disclaimed.
See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1995).
98. See, e.g., Highet, supra note 84, at 624.
99. See Berman & Dasser, supra note 83, at 27.
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ble, vague, inconsistent, incomplete, and unpredictable."'
Unfortunately, the hypothetical business practices generated
by my theoretical model could take any form, and thus cannot be
evaluated directly for their accessibility, clarity, consistency,
completeness, and predictability. Nevertheless, law merchant
scholars have cited an interesting example that strongly suggests
that business practices could be as accessible, clear, consistent,
complete, and predictable as are many recognized legal regimes.
Consider the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits 500 (1994) (UCP 500), published by the International
Chamber of Commerce.01 Although the UCP 500 does not pre-
tend to resolve every possible letter of credit issue, its articles are
accessible through widespread ICC publication, easy to read,
internally consistent, thorough as to issues addressed, and ren-
dered predictable through extensive commentary and published
ICC decisions. As a result, the UCP 500 enjoys nearly universal
acceptance in international letter of credit transactions and is
used in many domestic letter of credit transactions as well." 2
C. Summary
Like Nozick's account of the rise of the minimal state, the
foregoing account of the rise of commercial law can also be un-
derstood as an "invisible hand" process.0 3 Self-interested and
rational persons, who enjoy a natural right to liberty, will trade
goods and services with each other. Over time and after the
completion of many transactions, business practices will begin to
emerge. Individual traders may choose to band together in vol-
untary trade associations, resolving disputes in arbitration pro-
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See AMERCAN LAW INSTITUTE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED ARTICLE
5, LETrERS OF CREDIT: PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT xxii (1995). Some might argue that
the UCP 500 is not law-or even law merchant-but rather acts as a term of a con-
tract, because it applies only when incorporated into the text of the letter of credit.
UCP 500, Article 1. However, because the vast majority of letters of credit do incor-
porate the UCP in one version or another, see infra text accompanying note 250, its
characterization here as a type of law merchant approximating law is appropriate.
103. See Benson, supra note 59, at 660 ('Thus, evolving trade practices provided
the primary rules of evolving commercial law.").
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ceedings in which business practices serve as decisional norms.
When a trade association comes to dominate a trade or geo-
graphical area, its power to implement arbitration decisions
through private sanctions will increase until its decisions-and
their underlying norms-are de facto enforceable. In this man-
ner, business practices may approach the status of law-all
without any conscious design or government involvement.
III. LIBERTY, TRADE, AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The UCC is law in the positivist sense: uniform legislation
enacted by every state legislature in the United States."4 In
searching for the policy foundations of the Code, can anything be
learned from the foregoing account of voluntary trade associa-
tions creating their own commercial "law"? If so, what lessons
should be drawn?
A. Commerce and the Code
The UCC is firmly grounded in business practices. Article 1,
which contains general provisions that apply throughout the
Code, sets the tone. The UCC is "in large part a reformulation
and restatement of the law merchant and of the understanding
of a business community which transcends state and even na-
tional boundaries." 5 Thus, the Code finds its substantive
roots in the trading practices of the international merchant
community.0 6 Furthermore, the Code expressly provides that
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant, supple-
ment its provisions.0 7 Thus, if the Code-which already is
based on the law merchant-does not provide an answer, the
law merchant must be consulted directly.
104. See 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 1, at 5 (3d ed. 1988) ("Louisiana is the only state not to have adopted the entire
Code[, hiowever, [Louisiana] did enact Articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8.").
105. U.C.C. § 1-105 cmt, 3 (1995); see Benson, supra note 59, at 655; Danzig, su-
pra note 6, at 626; Juenger, supra note 83, at 219. But see Scott, supra note 6, at
737-39 (positing that the Code represents not law merchant, but rather regulation
that shifts risks).
106. See Medwig, supra note 58, at 590.
107. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1995).
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Section 1-102 identifies three key purposes and policies under-
lying the Code: "(a) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law
governing commercial transactions; (b) to permit the continued
expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and
agreement of the parties; (c) to make uniform the law among
various jurisdictions."" 8
The Official Comment to section 1-102 elaborates upon this
theme:
This Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is
intended to be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will
provide its own machinery for expansion of commercial
practices. It is intended to make it possible for the law em-
bodied in this Act to be developed by the courts in the light of
unforeseen and new circumstances and practices."°
Thus, consistent with the notion that the Code reflects current
business practices, the Code was designed to be flexible so that
it might evolve in connection with future business practices.
Significantly, the Code also allows merchants to agree to vary
the effect of its provisions, except as otherwise provided in the
Code." In other words, most Code provisions act as default
rules, unless expressly indicated otherwise."' Code obligations
of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care cannot be dis-
claimed under any circumstances."' Parties to a contract, how-
ever, may agree upon standards by which to determine whether
108. Id. § 1-102(2) (emphasis added).
109. Id. § 1-102 cmt. 1.
110. See id. § 1-102(3).
111. It is not always easy to determine whether a particular rule should be clas-
sified as a default rule that can be changed by agreement, or an immutable rule
that cannot be changed. Some Code provisions expressly state that they can be var-
ied by agreement, but others explain in statutory language or commentary that vari-
ation is not permitted. See id. § 1-102 cmt. 2 (1996). Many other provisions are
entirely silent.
Recognizing that Article 2 enshrines freedom of contract, Professors White and
Summers have struggled with the question of which Article 2 provisions are
nonvariable. They suggest that only a strong countervailing policy, such as good
faith or protection of third-party rights, can overcome the general presumption of
freedom of contract. For a fuller discussion, see 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note
104, § 3-10, at 184-86.
112. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1995).
1997] 1489
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1465
such obligations have been met, so long as the standards are not
manifestly unreasonable.1
3
According to basic Code definitions, an agreement is "the bar-
gain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by impli-
cation from other circumstances including course of dealing or
usage of trade or course of performance." A course of dealing
"is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a par-
ticular transaction ... [that] establish[es] a common basis of
understanding.""5 A usage of trade "is any practice or method
of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, voca-
tion or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed
with respect to the transaction in question."" 6 "A course of
dealing between parties and any usage of trade in the vocation
or trade in which [the parties] are engaged or of which they are
or should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement
or qualify terms of an agreement.""' Further, when a contract
for sale of goods involves repeated occasions for performance by
either party, and the other party knows the nature of the per-
formance and can object, a course of performance is relevant to
determine the meaning of the agreement."8 By recognizing
such implied terms, the Code- seeks to effectuate the parties'
actual expectations, which may extend far beyond the written
terms of the agreement. As one author has noted, the Code "as-
sumes that in many instances the parties' actual expectations
may be based more on trade practices than on the standard form
contracts they sign."'
Thus, when the Code directs a certain legal outcome, that out-
come may mean very little unless it is consistent with the will of
the parties and business practices. Any two individuals can
change the legal consequences that the Code purports to impose,
either by adopting an express term to the contrary, or by engag-
ing in a course of performance or course of dealing that estab-
113. See id.
114. Id. § 1-201(3).
115. Id. § 1-205(1).
116. Id. § 1-205(2).
117. Id. § 1-205(3).
118. See id. § 2-208(1).
119. Kastely, supra note 69, at 799 (referring to U.C.C. § 1-205).
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lishes a contrary implied term. Furthermore, multiple individu-
als engaged in the same trade can develop patterns of conduct
known as trade usages that will constitute implied terms, and
these implied terms also can change legal outcomes otherwise
prescribed by the Code.
In other words, the Code consciously attempts to devise legal
rules that are consistent with business practices. When Code
rules are inconsistent with business practices, resolution of the
conflict is simple: Business practices trump the Code.'
A glance at Article 2 reinforces the conclusion that business
120. Even bedrock principles are not sacred. To be sure, the Code imposes obliga-
tions of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care that cannot be disclaimed. See
U.C.C. § 1-102(3). However, the parties can agree on the standards by which perfor-
mance of such obligations is measured, so long as their standards are not manifestly
unreasonable. See id. Again, such agreement may be demonstrated through course of
dealing, trade usage, or course of performance. See id. § 1-102 cmt. 2.
To give a striking example of the primacy of agreement over law, consider the core
principle that every contract or duty within the Code imposes an obligation of good faith
in its performance or enforcement. See id. § 1-203. To resolve recent controversy over the
proper application of this principle, the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Com-
mercial Code added the following language to the Official Comment:
This section does not support an independent cause of action for failure
to perform or enforce in good faith. Rather, this section means that a
failure to perform or enforce, in good faith, a specific duty or obligation
under the contract, constitutes a breach of that contract or makes un-
available, under the particular circumstances, a remedial right or power.
This distinction makes it clear that the doctrine of good faith merely di-
rects a court towards interpreting contracts within the commercial context
in which they are created, performed, and enforced, and does not create a
separate duty of fairness and reasonableness which can be independently
breached.
Id. § 1-203, cmt. (West Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
How does a court interpret a contract within the commercial context? Further
commentary provides guidance. Because a party acts in good faith relative to the
agreement of the parties, the court must determine the substance of that agreement,
including not only express terms, but also such elements as* course of dealing and
trade usage. See Permanent Editorial Board Commentary No. 10 (Feb. '10, 1994),
reprinted in U.C.C. app. II (West Supp. 1996). A party who acts consistently with
the agreement, as properly understood in light of reasonable commercial practice,
acts in good faith. See id.
This commentary erodes the obligation of good faith and leaves it empty. The
parties already are obliged to perform their agreement, as properly understood in
light of course of dealing and trade usage. If "the correct perspective on the meaning
of good faith performance and enforcement is the Agreement of the parties," id.,
then § 1-203 adds nothing.
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practices have strongly influenced the Code. The provisions of
Article 2 make business practices and commercial standards the
legal norm. For example, section 2-103 defines "good faith" by a
merchant 2 ' as requiring honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."=
Consider also section 2-302, the controversial provision that
gives courts the power to strike down contracts or clauses within
contracts as unconscionable.' Comments emphasize that the
basic test of unconscionability involves determining whether a
contract or clause is unconscionable "in the light of the general
commercial background and the commercial needs of the partic-
ular trade or case."24 The parties must be allowed to present
evidence regarding the commercial setting, purpose, and effect of
the contract or clause' -an important reminder to the court
that, to a large extent, commerce defines conscionability.
Other Article 2 provisions make commercial reasonableness
the standard for determining various issues related to contract
performance. For example, when reasonable grounds for insecu-
rity exist with respect to the performance of either party, the
other party may demand adequate assurances of due perfor-
121. According to § 2-104(1), a "merchant" means:
[A] person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices
or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill
may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other in-
termediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such
knowledge or skill.
U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1995). Article 2 of the Code includes several other sections that
apply to or between merchants. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207(2), 2-209(2), 2-
312(3), 2-314, 2-327(1)(c), 2-402(2), 2-403(2), 2-509(3), 2-603, 2-605(1)(b), 2-609(2).
Many of these provisions, however, go far beyond codifying existing commercial prac-
tice. For example, the merchant exception to the Statute of Frauds, and the rule
binding merchants to additional terms when they fail to object, have been cited as
clear examples of Karl Llewellyn's concern for establishing new legal norms of fair-
ness among merchants. See Wiseman, supra note 6, at 505-06.
122. The merchant's obligation of good faith cannot be disclaimed. See U.C.C. § 1-
102(3). The parties, however, can agree upon standards for measuring good faith, so
long as those standards are not manifestly unreasonable. See id.
123. Professors White and Summers identified § 2-302, along with other Article 2
provisions that prohibit unconscionable terms, as a nonvariable term. See 1 WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 104, § 3-10, at 184.
124. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.
125. See id. § 2-302(2).
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mance, and, if commercially reasonable, suspend his own perfor-
mance.126 Section 2-615, which excuses sellers from perfor-
mance that has become impracticable, also indicates through its
comments that impracticability must be judged by prevailing
commercial standards.27
Commercial reasonableness also is relevant when assessing
damages under Article 2. When the buyer breaches the contract,
the seller may resell the goods in a commercially reasonable
manner, and recover the difference between the resale price and
the contract price from the buyer."m Incidental damages for
both aggrieved sellers and buyers are defined in terms of com-
mercially reasonable charges. 2
Most importantly, course of dealing, trade usage, and course
of performance play important roles within Article 2. Several
sections that prescribe reasonableness as the relevant legal stan-
dard explain in comments that reasonableness may be deter-
mined by course of dealing, trade usage, and course of perfor-
mance."'0 Certainly, throughout Article 2, comments remind
the reader that "agreements" include not only express terms, but
also course of deaing, trade usage, and course of perfor-
mance. 13 1  In sum, as one author has noted, "[t]he Code embod-
ies the beliefs that the reasonable practices and standards of the
commercial community are an appropriate source of legal obliga-
126. See id. § 2-609(1). Between merchants, the reasonableness of grounds for in-
security and the adequacy of any assurance offered also must be determined accord-
ing to commercial standards. See id. § 2-609(2); see also id. § 2-610(a) (providing
that when either party repudiates the contract, the other may await performance for
a commercially reasonable time).
Professors White and Summers identified § 2-609(1) as a nonvariable rule in-
tended to prevent one party from taking undue advantage by unfairly upsetting jus-
tifiable reliance. See 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 104, § 3-10, at 184 n.8.
127. See U.C.C. § 2-615 cmts. 1, 2, 6 & 10 (1995); see also id. § 2-614 (providing
that when an agreed manner of delivery becomes commercially impractible, a com-
mercially reasonable substitute. must be tendered and accepted).
128. See id. § 2-706(1).
129. See id. §§ 2-710, 2-715(1).
130. See id § 2-503(1)(a) cmt. 3 (discussing reasonableness of time and manner of
tender); § 2-508(2) cmt. 2 (outlining reasonable grounds to believe nonconforming
tender would be acceptable); § 2-513 cmt. 3 (discussing reasonable time, place, and
manner for buyer's inspection of goods).
131. See, e.g., id. at §§ 2-202 cmt. 2, 2-301 cmt., 2-308 cmt. 4, 2-309 cmt. 1, 2-
501 cmt. 3, 2-504 cmt. 2, 2-509 cmt. 5, 2-615 cmt. 8.
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tion and that these practices create actual expectations which
should be given full effect in the law."132 The question then be-
comes whether a Code that relies so heavily on business practic-
es has an adequate foundation in policy.
B. Liberty
Under the theoretical model of commercial law set forth in
Part II above, respect for individual liberty supports the use of
business practices as decisional norms. Can respect for individu-
al liberty support the codification of business practices within
the UCC?
Unlike the decisional norms employed in the theoretical mod-
el, the Code is not the product of a state of nature. Neverthe-
less, enough parallels exist between the theoretical model and
the Code to make reasoning by analogy both plausible and
informative.
The theoretical model first assumes that individuals within a
state of nature enjoy the right to liberty. Of course, we do not
live in a state of nature; however, we do live within a culture
that recognizes individual liberty as one of our highest val-
ues."3 More specifically, within the commercial realm, the law
has enshrined liberty in the fundamental principle of freedom of
contract."" This freedom gives businesspersons the opportunity
not only to enter into agreements, but also to adopt terms that
minimize transaction costs and maximize profits.
According to the theoretical model, when individuals trade
freely over many years and transactions, business practices
evolve. Similarly, over time and repeated transactions,
businesspersons use their freedom of contract to generate cours-
es of performance, courses of dealing, and most importantly,
trade usages. By adopting default rules based on business prac-
tices, the Code respects the liberty of countless individuals
whose choices originated those practices. Moreover, flexible legal
standards linked to business practices (such as commercial rea-
132. Kastely, supra note 69, at 780.
133. See Macintosh, supra note 80, at 517-18.
134. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3), cmt. 2 (stating that freedom of contract is a basic
principle of the Code).
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sonableness) respect not only past exercises of freedom, but also
current choices that shape business practices through ongoing
transactions.
So far, analysis reveals that freedom of contract is crucial in
analogizing between the theoretical model and the Code. Con-
tract law suggests that freedom of contract exists when the indi-
vidual has a reasonable opportunity to bargain over and under-
stand contract terms. 3 ' Thus, the analogy to the theoretical
model is strongest in contexts where most individuals enjoy such
opportunity.
To present a paradigm case under Article 2, imagine a whole-
sale market for goods, peopled by merchants who deal primarily
with each other. Assume that the merchants possess sophisticat-
ed knowledge of the goods and the trade and also hold roughly
equal bargaining power. Under these circumstances, when each
merchant bargains with the other, she can be expected to exer-
cise her knowledge and bargaining power consciously to select
contractual terms that maximize her profit. Over time, efficient
patterns of conduct will emerge that most merchants within the
trade observe regularly. The Code will recognize these trade us-
ages as being implied terms of agreements under Article 1, and
use them to flesh out Article 2 default standards based on com-
mercial reasonableness. Drawing its foundation from practices
that result from such freely made choices, the Code stands on
solid policy ground. Rather than imposing an alien framework
upon the commercial world, the Code most nearly replicates the
type of commercial "law" that the merchants could have fash-
ioned themselves. At the same time, the Code provides advan-
tages associated with statutory law, such as uniformity, clarity,
and predictability in commercial affairs." 6
135. Modem doctrine teaches that unconscionable contracts or terms are unen-
forceable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979); U.C.C. § 2-302
(1995). In determining unconscionability, one factor that courts have considered is
whether the weaker party had a reasonable opportunity to bargain over contract
terms. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 332-33 (2d ed. 1990); Jeffrey
C. Fort, Understanding Unconscionability: Defining the Principle, 9 LOY. U. Cm1. L.J.
765, 794-95 (1978). Similarly, the courts have invalidated contracts in cases in which
one party had no reasonable opportunity to understand hidden or incomprehensible
contract terms. See FARNSWORTH, supra at 332-33; Fort, supra, at 787-92.
136. As explained above, business practices can evolve to the point at which they
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Conversely, in contexts involving many individuals who do not
have a reasonable opportunity to bargain over and understand
contract terms, the analogy to the theoretical model weakens. As
explained above, business practices evolve in response to key
factors-such as the nature of the goods or services, location of
trading partners, transportation needs, and available technolo-
gy-that affect the profitability of transactions. When an indi-
vidual does not know or have a reasonable opportunity to learn
key facts, she cannot make choices based on those facts, and
thus, cannot contribute to the development of business practices.
Moreover, even a person who has full knowledge of key facts
cannot make "choices" based on those facts unless she has a
meaningful opportunity to select freely. As her bargaining power
and alternatives diminish, business practices are less the prod-
uct of her free choices. If one multiplies her experience by thou-
sands of similarly disadvantaged market participants, then the
libertarian argument for the codification of business practices
loses its force.
Before concluding this segment of analysis, one must compare
a final feature of the theoretical model with the Code. The model
suggests that a voluntary trade association could choose busi-
ness practices-perhaps embodied in a trade code-as the means
of resolving disputes. This would respect not only the liberty of
those who generate business practices over time, but also the
freedom of the specific, individual member who, by joining the
association, freely chooses those standards as her own.
Unlike the traders in the hypothetical model, commercial ac-
tors in the real world may not have joined any formal trade as-
sociations or consciously adopted any trade usages or codes.
How, then, does the Code protect the liberty of those who, for
whatever reason, disagree with the business practices embodied
in the Code and wish to devise their own? The solution imposed
by the UCC is simple but effective: A party may contract out of
most Code rules, either expressly, or impliedly through course of
performance or course of dealing.13
achieve goals that are characteristic of "law," including uniformity, clarity, and pre-
dictability. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102. The point is that enactment
of the Code may effect such goals more swiftly and surely.
137. See supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text. The Code establishes the
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C. The Individual vs. Society: A False Dichotomy?
The foregoing analysis casts some interesting light on recent
scholarship addressing the relationship of liberty to default rules
in general, and business practices in particular. First, Professor
Richard Craswell has argued that many philosophical theories of
promising do not have strong implications for the content of con-
tract law.'38 As a key example, Craswell cited the contract the-
ory of Charles- Fried, which roots the moral force of promises in
respect for individual liberty.'39 According to Craswell, the prin-
ciple of liberty has no implications for the content of default
rules. Any default rule would be consistent with individual free-
dom, so long as the parties were allowed to change the rule by
agreement.40 Thus, the law must invoke some other principle
to decide which default rules to adopt. Interestingly, as an ex-
ample of such other principle, Craswell cited the use of sociolog-
ical data-like business practices-to determine which rule most
parties already expect in various circumstances.'
Certainly any set of default rules could be consistent with in-
dividual freedom, so long as the parties enjoyed true freedom of
contract. However, it does not follow that liberty has no impli-
cations for the content of default rules themselves. Business
practices are more than just sociological data concerning expec-
tations within a particular trade. Under the right conditions,
business practices are the products of countless acts of free per-
sons performed over time. By codifying such practices, the UCC
adopts default rules that find their origin as well as their justifi-
cation in individual freedom. In other words, liberty provides a
process-oriented policy rationale for the decision to select busi-
following hierarchy- express terms reign supreme, followed by course of performance
(which is specific to a transaction) and course of dealing (which is specific to con-
tract parties). Trade usage, the most general of the three implied terms, carries the
least weight in case of conflict. See U.C.C. §§ 1-205(4), 2-208(2).
138. See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989).
139. See id. at 514 (citing FRIED, supra note 79, at the first, unnumbered, table
in his preface).
140. See id. at 515.
141. See id. at 505-08, 515.
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ness practices as default rules. 4 1
Second, Professor Amy Kastely has argued that the UCC es-
tablishes trade usage as a primary element in contractual obli-
gations. In her view, the primacy of trade usage reflects a move
away from the traditional, individualistic model of contract to-
ward a more modern, communal model that recognizes individ-
uals as social products operating within the trade community
and governed by its norms.
On the one hand, this argument states the obvious: Merchants
operate in a world defined largely by their trade community. On
the other hand, this argument goes too far in supposing that the
mere existence of a merchant community is inconsistent with
individual freedom. As Nozick suggested, human beings can
come together in a community without abandoning their rights
or their identity as individuals.'" What matters is the process
by which the community is formed and norms are chosen. As we
have seen, business practices are themselves the product of indi-
vidual choices, past, present, and future. By adopting business
practices as default rules, the Code resolves the false dichotomy
between individual and community, and reveals the essential
harmony between the two.
To summarize Part III, the drafters have crafted the Code as
a vehicle for the growth, development, and application of busi-
ness practices. Reasoning by analogy to the theoretical model of
commercial law presented by this Article, I conclude that liberty
stands as the bedrock moral foundation of the drafters' momen-
142. Some readers might object that liberty has no implications for the content of
default rules, because it has no implications for the content of business practices.
Left to their own devices, free individuals could develop virtually any practices; the
principle of liberty, in and of itself, does not allow us to predict what those practices
might be.
The principle of liberty, concededly, does not determine the content of specific
business practices. Indeed, Part II of this Article argued that business practices arise
as the product of economic goals, chosen as the most efficient means of allowing in-
dividuals to engage in profitable transactions. See supra text accompanying notes 65-
70. What the principle of liberty can do, however, is affect the content of default
rules by suggesting that business practices in general are an appropriate source.
143. See Kastely, supra note 69, at 813-17.
144. See supra discussion Parts I-II. See generally NOZICK, supra note 14. For ex-
ample, as individuals join protective associations, they maintain individual interests
and mold the association's rules toward those ends. See id. at 12-13.
1498
LIBERTY, TRADE, AND UCC
tous decision to allow individuals to govern their own commer-
cial affairs.
IV. ARTICLE 5: LETTERs OF CREDIT
As noted above, the UCC is experiencing upheaval, with near-
ly every article having been, or about to be, extensively re-
vised. 45 Revised Article 5 (Letters of Credit) provides what is
perhaps the most dramatic example of practice-driven lawmak-
ing. As more fully explained below, the drafters have chosen
statutes that mirror practice, in a conscious effort to ensure the
efficient function of the letter of credit device.
More is at stake here, however, than the efficient operation of
letters of credit. Revised Article 5 offers the opportunity to test
the general theory that commercial laws based on practice can
be justified on liberty grounds. Letter of credit practices, as ex-
plained below, can be characterized as the evolutionary product
of free choices, made by issuers, beneficiaries, applicants, and
other individuals who play a role within the letter of credit
world. Accordingly, it follows that the practice-based norms
within Article 5 can be justified on liberty grounds.-
A. History of Article 5
The letter of credit is a unique and ancient'46 commercial
specialty that serves two primary functions in modern transac-
tions: first, the commercial letter of credit effects swift and cer-
tain payment in sale of goods transactions; 47 second, the
145. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
146. See Rufus J. Trimble, The Law Merchant and the Letter of Credit, 61 HARV.
L. REV. 981, 982-86 (1948) (tracing the history of the letter of credit back to early
Egypt, ancient Greece, and Imperial Rome).
147. See Kerry L. Macintosh, Letters of Credit: Curbing Bad-Faith Dishonor, 25
UCC L.J. 3, 5 (1992). The following example of a transaction involving a commercial
letter of credit may be helpful:
[Siuppose Seller wants to sell goods to Buyer, a new customer in another
state or foreign country.... So that the deal may go forward, Buyer
applies to his own bank for issuance of a commercial letter of credit
naming Seller as beneficiary. As issuer of the credit Buyer's bank promis-
es to honor Seller's draft or other demand for payment in the amount of
the purchase price, upon presentation of documents specified in the letter
of credit. These documents may include an invoice, a document of title
1997] 1499
1500 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1465
standby letter of credit secures proper performance of contrac-
tual obligations. "8
For decades, the letter of credit was governed by common law
decisions' and by the Uniform Customs and Practice for Doc-
umentary Credits (UCP), a statement of international custom
and practice as observed in the letter of credit operations com-
munity.5 ' During the 1940s and 1950s, however, the drafters
of the UCC undertook to regulate the letter of credit. 5' When
first proposed, Article 5 of the Code was highly controversial; in
particular, the banking community objected that codification
would ossify the law and undermine the flexibility that the let-
ter of credit needed in order to be responsive to changing com-
mercial needs.'52 Following an extensive review of early drafts,
the New York Law Revision Commission wrote a detailed report
criticizing individual provisions of Article 5 and questioning
whether codification truly was necessary."'
evidencing shipment of the goods, certificates of insurance and inspection,
and other documents intended to assure Buyer that he will indeed re-
ceive the goods ordered. After Seller presents the required documents and
receives payment, Buyer, as letter-of-credit customer, must reimburse his
bank. Upon receiving reimbursement, Buyer's bank releases the docu-
ments to Buyer, so that he can retrieve the goods from the carrier.
Id. at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).
148. See id. at 6. Again, the following description of a transaction involving a
standby letter of credit is instructive:
[Sluppose Owner wants Contractor to build a skyscraper, but worries
that Contractor might fail to complete construction in accordance with
the contract terms. To reassure Owner, Contractor obtains a standby let-
ter of credit from his bank naming Owner as beneficiary. As issuer of
the credit, Contractor's bank promises to honor Owner's draft or other
demand for payment of a specified amount of liquidated damages, upon
presentation of a document certifying that Contractor has defaulted on
his contract obligations .... [Ihf Owner claims default and draws on the
standby credit, Contractor's bank must make payment, and Contractor
must reimburse his bank.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
149. Trimble, supra note 146, at 986-1003.
150. See James E. Byrne, The Revision of U.C.C. Article 5: A Strategy for Success, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 13, 17 (1990). The UCP was first published in 1933. See BROOKE
WUNNICKE & DIANE B. WuNNIcKE, UCP 500 AND STANDBY LETTERS OF CREDIT ix (1994).
151. See Byrne, supra note 150, at 17 & n.8.
152. See id. at 18-22.
153. See id.; see generally 1 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORT OF THE LAW RE-
VISION COMMISSION FOR 1954 AND RECORD OF HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMER-
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Perhaps in response to such concerns, the drafters produced a
supremely flexible letter of credit law that respected freedom of
contract.M The phrase "unless otherwise agreed" appeared fif-
teen times throughout original Article 5's seventeen
provisions.'55 As if that were not enough, the drafters included
the following cautionary provision:
This Article deals with some but not all of the rules and
concepts of letters of credit as such rules or concepts have
developed prior to this act or may hereafter develop. The fact
that this Article states a rule does not by itself require,
imply or negate application of the same or a converse rule to
a situation not provided for or to a person not specified by
this Article.'56
Official commentary elaborated on this theme:
Subsection (3) recognizes that in the present state of the
law and variety of practices as to letters of credit, no statute
can effectively or wisely codify all the possible law of letters
of credit without stultifying further development of this use-
ful financing device.... [Tihe second sentence of subsection
(3) makes explicit the court's power to apply a particular rule
by analogy to cases not within its terms, or to refrain from
doing so. Under section 1-102(1) such application is to follow
the canon of liberal interpretation to promote underlying pur-
poses and policies. Since the law of letters of credit is still
developing, conscious use of that canon and attention to fun-
damental theory by the court are peculiarly appropriate. 5 '
CIAL CODE (1954) (including opinions from both the Commission and industry mem-
bers stating that letter of credit codifications were unnecessary).
154. See 3 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT J. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
§ 26-3, at 121 (4th ed. 1995).
155. See id. Professors White and Summers argued that only a handful of original
Article 5's provisions are nonvariable, including section 5-106(4), section 5-109(1) (ob-
ligating issuer to deal with customer in good faith), section 5-114(1) (requiring issuer
to honor complying demand for payment), and section 5-116(2) (allowing beneficiary
to assign right to proceeds). See id.
156. U.C.C. § 5-102(3) (1991).
157. Id. cmt. 2.
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Despite such accommodations, New York-the most important
center of letter of credit practice-remained skeptical. New York
reluctantly adopted Article 5 in 1962, but only after adding a
non-uniform amendment to section 5-102, the provision govern-
ing the scope of Article 5:158
Unless otherwise agreed, this Article 5 does not apply to a
letter of credit or a credit if by its terms or by agreement,
course of dealing or usage of trade such letter of credit or
credit is subject in whole or in part to the Uniform Customs
and Practice for Commercial Documentary Credits fixed by
the Thirteenth or by any subsequent Congress of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce.159
Given New York's importance as a commercial center, and the
fact that most letters of credit incorporate the UCP (whether
expressly or pursuant to course of dealing or usage of trade),6 '
this non-uniform amendment seriously undermined the drafters'
efforts to achieve a uniform letter of credit law.16
Decades later, in 1986, the Letter of Credit Subcommittee of
the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the Business Law
section of the American Bar Association appointed the Task
Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, charging members with
the task of examining Article 5 and recommending changes.162
158. See Byrne, supra note 150, at 20-21.
159. N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-102(4) (Consol. Supp. 1996). Alabama and Missouri have
added similar nonconforming amendments to their versions of section 5-102. See ALA.
CODE § 7-5-102(4) (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.5-102(4) (West 1994).
160. See Donald J. Rapson, Who Is Looking Out for the Public Interest? Thoughts
About the UCC Revision Process in the Light (and Shadows) of Professor Rubin's Ob-
servations, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 249, 271 (1994).
161. Over the years, New York courts have softened the blow, applying Article 5
principles by analogy to resolve issues not addressed by the UCP. See Task Force on
the Examination of U.C.C. Article 5, An Examination of U.C.C. Article 5 (Letters of
Credit), reprinted in 45 BUS. LAW. 1521, 1559 (1990) [hereinafter Task Force Report].
For example, under established common law principles, the applicant could obtain an
injunction against payment when a beneficiary presented fraudulent documents.
Original Article 5 codified these principles in section 5-114. Because the UCP does
not address injunctive relief in case of fraud, the New York courts have felt free to
apply section 5-114 by analogy. See United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods
Corp., 360 N.E.2d 943, 947 & nn.2-3, 948-52 (1976).
162. See Task Force Report, supra note 161, at 1527.
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Professor James Byrne served as Chairman of the Task Force,
which released a lengthy and detailed Report in 1989.163
Among other issues, the Task Force considered whether Article
5 should expressly refer to the UCP.'" The Task Force quickly
raised several reasons for clarifying the "uneasy" relationship
between the Code and the UCP,'65 including bringing New
York back into the fold of uniform law, educating judges as to
the importance of the UCP, and resolving conflicts 66 that ex-
isted between Article 5 and the UCP.'67
Having considered the problem thoroughly, the Task Force
issued the following Opinion:
There is much wisdom in the dual scheme which has
emerged by which rules of practice are articulated by a non-
legislative body in intimate contact with the letter of credit
industry, on the one hand, and statutory rules are of a more
skeletal character. The two approaches complement one an-
other and permit maximum flexibility without compromising
basic concerns regarding the character of legal obligations,
rights, and duties which are necessary to provide certainty
and predictability.
As a result, any revisions should preserve this balance,
strengthening the foundational character of the statute and
welcoming clarification of trade practices where appropriate.
As a general drafting principle and rule of construction, it
is wise and desirable to limit the number of overt conflicts
with the U.C.P. and to smooth those which exist.
Commentary which makes explicit reference to the signifi-
cant role played by trade codes in letter of credit practice
would be most helpful. While it would be inappropriate for a
statute to prejudge this matter, a comment for guidance
would be useful to the effect that 'the incorporation of the
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits in
letters of credit is routinely respected by courts'. Commentary
163. Task Force Report, supra note 161.
164. See id. at 1558.
165. See id. at 1559-60.
166. The Report noted four areas of conflict: (1) time for honor; (2) the effect of a
decision to honor; (3) transfer and assignment; and (4) credits silent as to irrevoca-
bility. See id. at 1560.
167. See 1d. at 1559-60.
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can also indicate where variation is permissible in U.C.C.
Article 5. This approach would ease concerns regarding the
relationship of the U.C.C. with the U.C.P., would assist law-
yers in drawing the attention of courts to the U.C.P., and
move toward greater international harmonization."
Thus, the Task Force recognized that Article 5 played an im-
portant role in articulating basic legal rights and obligations.
The Task Force recommendations regarding the UCP were rela-
tively modest: first, whenever possible, Article 5 and the UCP
should be consistent, and, second, whenever possible, Article 5
should include commentary to direct courts to respect the UCP.
Shortly after the Task Force released its Report, NCCUSL
agreed to revise Article 5.1"9 Meanwhile, in 1989, the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce's Commission on Banking Tech-
nique and Practice authorized a revision of the UCP. v° As a
result, the UCP and Article 5 underwent revision at approxi-
mately the same time. 7' The UCP revision process moved fast-
168. Id. at 1560-61.
169. See Gerald T. McLaughlin & Neil B. Cohen, Revision of UCC Article 5 and
Restatement of Suretyship, N.Y. L.J., June 8, 1994, at 3.
At about the same time, Professor Byrne, formerly the Chairman of the ABA
Task Force, penned a symposium article recommending strategies for revision suc-
cess. "In retrospect, the great failure of [the original] U.C.C. article 5 was its inabili-
ty to attract the adherence of the world's banking center, New York," he lamented.
Byrne, supra note 150, at 13. The fundamental problem leading to this failure was
simple:
[Tihe drafters failed to grasp the significance of the U.C.P. Even though
there was no prior statutory scheme, letter of credit law could not be
written on a tabula rasa. The field was occupied in large part by the
U.C.P., which articulated the understanding of the international banking
community as to the character and nature of the undertakings involved.
Id. at 17.
Having offered this diagnosis, Byrne offered his prescription for a successful re-
vision of Article 5: the drafters should work toward a model law stating universal
principles, based on letter of credit practice. "[T]his practice, warts and all, is the only
authentic basis available for the legislative exercise," he opined. Id. at 29. "What must
be elicited are rules founded on the ideal or best practice of bankers." Id.
170. See Charles del Bustro, Preface to U.C.P. 500, at 4, reprinted in WUNNICKE
& WUNNICKE, supra note 150, at 55.
171. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, UCC REVISED ARTICLE 5. LETTERS OF CREDIT PRO-
POSED FINAL DRAFT xv-xvii, xii-xxiii (1995) (stating the reason for revision was to
conform the Article 5 rules to current international customs and practices reflected
1997] LIBERTY, TRADE, AND UCC 1505
er, however, and was completed first. The Commission approved
the "Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Cred-
its-1993 Revision," made effective on January 1, 1994.172
Known as the UCP 500, this document made a number of impor-
tant changes and clarifications in letter of credit practice and
policy. 73 Playing catch-up, the UCC's drafters completed and
released an Official Text of revised Article 5 in 1995.174
B. Revised Article 5 and the Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits
Like its predecessor, revised Article 5 embraces freedom of
contract. 75 With the exception of a few nonvariable terms, re-
vised Article 5 is composed of default rules, the effect of which
can be varied by agreement or provisions incorporated in the
letter of credit. 76 Thus, when a letter of credit expressly incor-
porates the UCP 500, to the extent that any conflict exists be-
tween the UCP and variable provisions of Article 5, the UCP
governs.
177
in the UCP).
172. See UCP 500 & 400 COMPARED III (Charles del Bustro ed., 1993).
173. See WUNNICKE & WUNNICKE, supra note 150, at ix.
174. See AMEmICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE PORTABLE UCC: 1995 OFFICIAL TEXT iv
(Corrine Cooper ed., 1995) (listing promulgation dates).
175. See Rapson, supra note 160, at 269 (quoting the U.S. Council on Internation-
al Banking, Inc., "[rievised UCC Article 5 should unequivocally favor freedom of con-
tract"); 3 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 154, § 26-3, at 121.
176. U.C.C. § 5-103(c) (1995). The effect of the following revised provisions may
not be varied: § 5-103(a) (applying Article 5 to letters of credit); § 5-103(c) (stating
nonvariable provisions); § 5-103(d) (providing that letter of credit rights and obliga-
tions are independent of the underlying transaction); § 5-102(a)(9) & (10) (defining
the terms "issuer" and "letter of credit"); § 5-106(d) (providing that a "perpetual" let-
ter of credit expires five years after date of issuance); § 5-114(d) (limiting ability of
issuer to withhold consent to assignment of proceeds); § 5-117(d) (stating that subro-
gation rights do not arise until issuer pays).
In addition, obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care im-
posed by the Code may not be disclaimed. See id. § 1-102(3).
177. See id § 5-116(c). The fact that a letter of credit incorporates the UCP does
not render Article 5 entirely inapplicable. See id. § 5-116 cmt. 3. Some Article 5 pro-
visions cannot be varied. See supra note 176. Many others are consistent with the
UCP. See U.C.C. § 5-116 cmt. 3. Still other provisions address legal issues that the
UCP has (for now) left untouched, such as the applicant's right to obtain an injunc-
tion against honor when the beneficiary presents documents that are forged or mate-
rially fraudulent. See id. § 5-109.
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If parties do not "agree otherwise," what results then? What
kind of default rules have the drafters chosen for Article 5, and
why? As explained above, the ABA Task Force recommended
that any revision of Article 5 should limit and smooth over exist-
ing conflicts with international rules and practices as reflected
in the UCP. l ' This recommendation was both admonitory and
neutral in tone. The Task Force did not mandate the elimination
of all conflicts, nor did it command that Article 5 be the one to
change and conform.'79 Examination of the new Official Text of
Article 5, however, suggests that the drafters went beyond the
Task Force's modest recommendation.
Many of the revisions to Article 5 have a copycat look, sug-
gesting that the UCP has become the dominant party in the un-
easy relationship between the two. 8 ' Perhaps the dominance
of the UCP results from a subtle shift in philosophy. Although
the UCC's drafters emphasized the need for uniformity, their
arguments seem more directed at achieving conformity with
international practice:
Letters of Credit are a major instrument in international
trade, as well as domestic transactions. To facilitate its use-
fulness and competitiveness, it is essential that U.S. law be in
harmony with international rules and practices, as well as
flexible enough to accommodate changes in technology and
practices that have, and are, evolving. Not only should the
The history of section 5-116(c) is interesting. In June 1993, when the Article 5
revision was already in its seventh draft, the U.S. Council on International Banking,
Inc. (USCIB), an industry association composed of domestic and international banks,
indicated that it could not support the revision as it was. See Rapson, supra note
160, at 268. USCIB objected that the draft failed to recognize the importance of the
UCP, relegating it to mere incorporated contract language that could not displace
any Code obligation of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, or care. See id. Con-
cerned about USCIB's withdrawal of support, the drafting committee responded by
adding section 5-116(c), which emphasizes the UCP's dominance over virtually all
Article 5 provisions. See id. at 269.
Not everyone is pleased with section 5-116(c). See id. at 271. One author has
complained that section 5-116(c) "ced[es] to an international group-here, the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce-the right and ability to make rules governing issuer
liability over which state law would have no control." Id.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 164-68.
179. See Task Force Report, supra note 161, at 1560-61.
180. See infra notes 183-200 and accompanying text.
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rules be consistent within the United States, but they need to
be substantively and procedurally consistent with internation-
al practices.
Thus, the goals of the drafting effqrt were:
* conforming the Article 5 rules to current customs
and practices;
* accommodating new forms of Letters of Credit,
changes in customs and practices, and evolving
technology, particularly the use of electronic media;
* maintaining Letters of Credit as an inexpensive
and efficient instrument facilitating trade; and
* resolving conflicts among reported decisions.'8 '
In making their case for enactment, the drafters further as-
serted that "Irlevisions have been made to Article 5 to coordinate
the Article 5 rules with current international practice," as reflect-
ed in the UCP 500.182 Official commentary added that "Article
5 is consistent with and was influenced by the rules in the exist-
ing version of the UCP.""'5
Many specific provisions illustrate this influence. For example,
-the UCP 500 provides that credits are deemed irrevocable unless
clearly indicated otherwise."M Revised Article 5 achieves the
same result with different language: A letter of credit is revoca-
ble only if its terms so provide.'85
181. AIERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 171, at xvi-xvii (emphasis added).
182. Id. at xxii-xxiii (emphasis added).
183. U.C.C. § 5-101 cmt. (1995) (emphasis added).
184. See U.C.P. 500, art. 6(c) (1994), reprinted in WUNNICKE & WUNNICKE, supra
note 150, at 53, 59 [hereinafter U.C.P. 500]. This is an about-face; former interna-
tional practice provided that a letter of credit was deemed revocable unless it clearly
indicated otherwise. See Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Cred-
its-1983 Revision, art. 7 (1983) [hereinafter UCP 400]. The UCP 400 presumption
of revocability was unpopular; because most credits were intended to provide irrevo-
cable commitments, the presumption undermined letter of credit reliability. See UCP
500 & 400 COMPARED, supra note 172, at 14.
185. See U.C.C. § 5-106(a) (1995). Of course, American common law has long held
that letters of credit are deemed irrevocable unless otherwise stated. See
Weyerhauser Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 27 UCC Rep. Serv. P&F 777, 782 (S.D. Iowa
1979); West Va. Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (W.D. Pa.
1976). Some might argue that international practice is being molded and altered by
law-rather than the other way around. Significantly, however, Article 5 took no po-
sition on the revocability issue until now-when doing so supports, rather than con-
flicts with, the UCP. See U.C.C. § 5-106 cmt. 1. Accordingly, the sudden codification
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Other parallels are even more striking. Under the UCP 500,
when a beneficiary demands payment, an issuer must examine
his documents with reasonable care to determine whether they
appear to comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of
credit.' Whether the stipulated documents comply on their
face with the terms and conditions of the credit is now deter-
mined by international standard banking practice as reflected in
the UCP.8 7
Similarly, revised Article 5 states that an issuer must honor
a presentation that appears on its face strictly to comply with
the terms and conditions of the letter of credit.' Strict com-
pliance must be determined by the standard practice of finan-
cial institutions that regularly issue letters of credit.'89 Com-
mentary explains that standard practice includes international
practice set forth in or referenced by the UCP, as well as other
practice rules published by banking associations, and local and
regional practices. 9 '
To give a final example, the UCP 500 allows an issuer a rea-
sonable time, not to exceed seven banking days following the
day on which documents are received, to examine the documents
of this basic principle within revised Article 5 can be characterized fairly as an at-
tempt to conform American law to international practice. See AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE, supra note 171, at xxii-xxiii (giving Article 5s addition of an irrevocability
provision as an example of conformity between the UCC and international practice).
186. See U.C.P. 500, art. 13(a).
187. See id.
188. See U.C.C. § 5-108(a). By contrast, the original Article 5 provided only that
an issuer has an obligation to honor a draft or demand for payment which complied
with the terms of the letter of credit. See U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1994). Failure to define
compliance led to a confusing proliferation of different standards, ranging from
"strict" (requiring mirror-image compliance) through "substantial" (requiring only rea-
sonable compliance). See Carolyn Hotchkiss, Strict Compliance in Letter-of-Credit
Law: How Uniform Is the Uniform Commercial Code?, 23 UCC L.J. 288 (1991);
Macintosh, supra note 147, at 25-28.
189. See U.C.C. §§ 5-108(a)-(e) (1995). Whether the issuer has observed standard
practice is a matter of interpretation for the court, which must offer parties a rea-
sonable opportunity to present evidence of standard practice. See id. § 5-108(e). Re-
vised Article 5 authorizes the courts, rather than juries, to determine the standard
practice and thus should encourage consistent outcomes and speedier resolution of
disputes. See id. cmt. 1.
190. See id. cmt. 8.
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and decide whether to accept or refuse them. 9' If the issuer
decides to refuse the documents, it must give notice to the pre-
senting bank or beneficiary without delay, but must do so no
later than the close of the seventh banking day following the day
of receipt of the documents.'92 Such notice must state all dis-
crepancies that justified rejection of the documents;' other-
wise, the issuer cannot claim in a subsequent wrongful dishonor
suit that the documents do not comply with the credit.'
Unlike prior law,'95 revised Article 5 is deliberately consis-
tent with the UCP approach.'96 An issuer has a reasonable
time after presentation-up to seven business days' 9 after the
day on which documents are received-to honor, or to dishonor
with notice of discrepancies.'98 An issuer is strictly precluded
from asserting as a basis for dishonor any discrepancy if timely
notice is not given, or any discrepancy not stated in a notice
timely given.'9 9 The requirement that the issuer send notice of
191. See U.C.P. 500, art. 13(b).
192. See id. art. 14(d)(i).
193. See id. art. 14(d)(ii).
194. See id. art. 14(e). These provisions are largely consistent with earlier state-
ments of international custom. UCP 400 provided for inspection within an (unspeci-
fied) reasonable time, prompt notice of documentary defects, and strict preclusion
against any issuer who failed to give proper notice. U.C.P. 400, art. 16(c)-(e).
195. Under the original Article 5, the issuer did not have a -reasonable time," but
rather three banking days following receipt of documents to decide whether to honor
or dishonor. See U.C.C. § 5-112(1)(a) (1994). Moreover, the original Article 5 did not
expressly require the issuer to identify documentary defects that compelled dishonor,
leaving the beneficiary unsure as to what he had to do to cure the documents and
make a complying presentation before the credit expired. See Macintosh,, supra note
147, at 30. Supplementing the Code with equitable doctrine, some courts held that
an issuer who failed to notify the beneficiary of documentary defects waived those
defects. See id. at 31. Because the doctrine of waiver applied, however, only when
the beneficiary could have cured the defects, it differed from the UCP, which enforc-
es strict preclusion against the issuer regardless of whether the beneficiary suffered
detriment. See id.
196. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
197. Official commentary notes that "[t]he outside limit of [reasonable] time is
measured in business days under the UCC and in banking days under the UCP, a
difference that will rarely be significant." U.C.C. § 5-108 cmt. 2 (1995). Neither
business nor banking days are defined in Article 5. See id.
198. See id. § 5-108(b). The seven-day period is not a safe harbor; an issuer must
give notice in the lesser of a reasonable time, or seven business days. See id. What
is a "reasonable time" must be determined with reference to the actions of those in
the business of examining documents, mostly banks. See id. cmt. 2.
199. See id. § 5-108(c). Thus, revised Article 5 rejects prior decisions holding that
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the discrepancies or be precluded from asserting them is taken
from the similar provision in the UCP 500, and is intended to
promote certainty and finality."'
To summarize, letter of credit law has internalized letter of
credit practice. In effect, revised Article 5 has become a vehicle
for the legislative and judicial recognition of the UCP 500, and
any other commercial practices that may develop over time.
C. Efficiency
Does policy justify the Code's reliance on international prac-
tice as reflected in the UCP 500? Or, have the drafters simply
knuckled under, in the fear that banks otherwise might lobby
against the legislative enactment of revised Article 5?21
The letter of credit is a valuable and popular commercial de-
vice for two reasons: first, the credit assures the beneficiary of
receiving prompt and reliable payment from a financial institu-
tion;. 2  and second, credits are appealingly inexpensive.2"
Thus, anything that interferes with the issuer's decision to pay,
by making it slower, less certain, or more expensive, strikes at
the very heart of the letter of credit device, and seriously under-
mines its commercial utility."4 To put it another way, the let-
ter of credit is particularly sensitive to transaction costs. Any-
thing that interferes with the issuer's decision to pay, and that
increases transaction costs, correspondingly decreases the ef-
ficiency of the letter of credit."5
Given these basic truths, it comes as no surprise that opera-
tional efficiency is one of the major concerns in letter of credit
discrepancies are waived only if the beneficiary could have cured them, given proper
notice. See id. cmt. 3. The advantage of the new, strict preclusion rule is that it
forecloses litigation about reliance and detriment. Id.
200. See id.
201. See Rapson, supra note 160, at 277-81.
202. See Macintosh, supra note 147, at 6.
203. The average charge for issuing a commercial letter of credit is a mere one
percent of the total face amount. Standby letters of credit cost somewhat more: the
charge hovers from one to three percent of the total face amount of the credit. See
Vincent Maulella, Quicker to the 'Green.- Standby Letters of Credit Extend Business
Drive, CORP. CASHFLOW MAG., Sept. 1994, at 21.
204. See Macintosh, supra note 147, at 7.
205. See Maulella, supra note 203, at 21.
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practice. The desire to achieve such efficiency underlies many
UCP provisions,"' and thus serves as the foundation for coun-
terpart provisions in revised Article 5.
The importance of operational efficiency to letter of credit
practice and law can be illustrated with one key example."7 A
variety of standards for determining documentary compliance
proliferated under original Article 5.20' The predominant stan-
dard, the mirror image rule, required issuers to reject docu-
ments even when discrepancies were trivial.0 9 Studies re-
leased while the UCP was in the process of revision indicated
that up to ninety percent of documents initially presented for
payment under letters of credit did not comply with stated terms
and conditions.210 The same studies confirmed that most letters
206. See Jean-Charles Rouhen, Foreword to U.C.P. 500, reprinted in WUNNIcKE
WUNNICKE, supra note 150, at 54.
207. Another example of the drive toward operational efficiency can be found in
UCP 500's approach to nondocumentary conditions. See U.C.P. 500, art. 13(c). One of
the most fundamental premises of letter of credit practice is that all parties deal
with documents, and not with goods, services, or other performances to which the
documents may relate. U.C.P. 500, art. 4. In other words, payment depends on pa-
per, not facts. Despite this fundamental truth, the commercial realm has been bom-
barded in recent years with letters of credit that include nondocumentary condi-
tions-in other words, conditions that require issuers to go beyond the documents to
verify that certain events have occurred, or that certain facts are true. See Janis
Penton Soshuk, The Consequences of Nondocumentary Conditions, 56 BROOK. L. REV.
33, 34-5 (1990). By requiring issuers to go beyond the world of paper,
nondocumentary conditions introduce operational uncertainty and expense. See id.
UCP 500 resolves this problem by adding a new practice: if a credit contains
nondocumentary conditions, banks will deem the conditions as not stated and will
disregard them. U.C.P. 500, art. 13(c). Commentary indicates that the ICC consid-
ered two solutions: allowing banks to accept documents reflecting satisfaction of the
condition, or treating the nondocumentary condition as surplusage that could be dis-
regarded. The latter solution was chosen for its conceptual simplicity and operational
ease. See UCP 500 & 400 COMPARED, supra note 172, at 43.
Similarly, revised Article 5 provides that an issuer shall disregard
nondocumentary conditions and treat them as if they were not stated. See U.C.C. §
5-108(g) (1995). According to the comments, nondocumentary conditions have no
place in a regime where the issuer's basic obligation is to examine documents and
make a prompt decision to honor or dishonor. See id. cmt. 9. The new rule, appear-
ing for the first time in Article 5, has a further advantage: "[i]n requiring that
nondocumentary conditions in letters of credit be ignored as surplusage, Article 5
remains aligned with the UCP." Id.
208. See supra note 188.
209. See Macintosh, supra note 147, at 7.
210. See id. at 3.
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of credit were honored eventually, either because applicants
waived documentary defects, or because beneficiaries cured the
defects and made a second, more successful presentation.21'
This system suffered from high transaction costs as banks hus-
tled to obtain waivers from applicants and notify beneficiaries of
required corrections while beneficiaries were consigned to the
purgatory of correcting meaningless typographical errors.212
The system also undermined the business community's confi-
dence in the reliability of the letter of credit.21'
The UCP 500 seeks to improve operational efficiency by choos-
ing a new standard: Documentary compliance is now determined
by international standard banking practice, as reflected in the
UCP 500.214 For example, although the description of the goods
in a commercial invoice must correspond precisely with the de-
scription as set forth in the letter of credit, the UCP 500 pro-
vides that in all other documents, the goods may be described in
general terms not inconsistent with the description in the letter
of credit.21' A bank thus can make payment against a bill of
lading that describes the goods generally as "cats," even though
the description in the letter of credit specifies Abyssinian or
Russian Blue cats.
In support of this new standard, the UCP drafters have ar-
gued that the mirror image rule did not provide a functional
standard, resulting in a proliferation of litigation and costly un-
certainty throughout the letter of credit world.2"' Further, com-
petitive banking ensures that international standard banking
custom and practice is both honest and predictable.217 Thus,
the new standard is intended to enhance the letter of credit de-
vice by making it easier for banks to make payment, without
obtaining waivers or correction of documentary defects that
international standard banking practice recognizes as being in-
211. See id.
212. See Boris Kozolchyk, Strict Compliance and the Reasonable Document
Checker, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 45, 48-49 (1990).
213. See id. at 49.
214. See U.C.P. 500, art. 13(a).
215. See id. art. 37(c).
216. See UCP 500 & 400 COMPARED, supra note 172, at 100.
217. See id. at 39.
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significant.
The ABA Task Force Report,21 which examined and recom-
mended changes to Article 5 before the revision process began,
expressed similar views. Documentary compliance standards had
proliferated and were applied in a confusing manner.219 Accord-
ing to the Task Force, the mirror image rule (described as a 'hy-
per-technical" interpretation of the strict compliance standard)
did not reflect the realities of practice, harmed letter of credit
operations, and discredited the letter of credit as a reliable de-
vice."' The Task Force proposed a new compliance standard,
based on banking practices.22" ' As explained above, this thinking
ultimately made its way into revised Article 5, which now mea-
sures strict compliance by the standard practice of letter of credit
issuers.2 Like the UCP 500, then, the Code now allows banks
to pay without obtaining waivers or correction of defects that
standard practice recognizes as minor.2 ' The UCC's drafters
hope that, by making payment faster and cheaper, the new com-
pliance standard will lower transaction costs, and enable the
letter of credit device to function more efficiently.2"
218. See Task Force Report, supra note 161.
219. See id. at 1608.
220. See id. at 1609.
221. See id. at 1609-10. The standard was couched in terms somewhat different
from those chosen by UCP 500, and employed in the current version of revised Arti-
cle 5. "[S]trict compliance means what a knowledgeable diligent document checker
would have accepted as being in facial compliance with the terms of the credit," the
Report asserted. Id. at 1609. The basic thrust of the ABA standard, however is the
same: discrepancies should be determined in accordance with banking practice. See
id. at 1609-10.
222. See U.C.C. § 5-108(a), (e) (1995).
223. For example, the comments indicate that obvious typographical errors, clear
abbreviations, and failure to capitalize letters can be overlooked. See id. cmt. 1.
224. See id. Skeptics may question how banks can know what standard practice
is. Indeed, this is an all-important question. The more uncertain the content of stan-
dard practice is, the less simple payment decisions become. At an extreme, such
uncertainty could render the new compliance standard costlier than the old mirror
image rule, as banks frantically research the answers necessai-y to determine
whether they should pay against defective documents (to avoid the beneficiary's
wrongful dishonor lawsuit) or dishonor (to protect themselves against the applicant's
refusal to reimburse). The drafters have tried to minimize such concerns in two
ways. First, commentary indicates that there are already several sources of standard
practice, including the UCP 500, practice rules published by banking associations,
and local and regional practices. See U.C.C. § 5-108 cmt. 8 (1995). For example, the
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D. Liberty
The letter of credit community has not attempted to justify
the Article 5 revisions on grounds other than operational effi-
ciency. This Part presents an argument that liberty grounds can
also justify the codification of letter of credit practice within re-
vised Article 5.
This analysis begins by briefly sketching the letter of credit
world and its participants. Whether commercial or standby, a
typical letter of credit transaction involves at least three parties:
the issuer, beneficiary, and applicant."5 A commercial letter of
credit is a device used to pay for goods. The buyer applies to the
issuer for the issuance of a letter of credit in favor of the seller
as beneficiary." 6 A standby letter of credit can be used in any
transaction in which one contract party feels insecure about the
performance of the other.22 The party whose performance is in
doubt asks the issuer to issue a letter of credit in favor of the
party who wants security, as beneficiary."' Thus, the universe
of letter of credit beneficiaries, and applicants may be extremely
broad, including sellers of goods, buyers of goods, and other per-
sons involved in a wide assortment of commercial transactions.
Because use of the letter of credit spans every trade under the
sun, from artichokes to zippers, beneficiaries and applicants are
too diverse to easily form associations representing letter of
credit users.2 9
USCIB has been working to compile "white books of documentary practice" that
would establish national standards of document examination. See Kozolchyk, supra
note 212, at 75-76. Second, the provision authorizes courts to determine what consti-
tutes standard practice, after offering parties a reasonable opportunity to present ev-
idence. See U.C.C. § 5-108(e). The drafters hope that allowing courts, rather than ju-
ries, to determine standard practice will encourage consistent outcomes and speedier
resolution of disputes. See id. cmt. 1.
225. See generally 3 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 154, § 26-2, at 112-13 (giving
a basic understanding of a letter of credit transaction).
226. For a fuller explanation of the commercial letter of credit, see supra note 147.
227. See generally 3 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 154, § 26-1(b), at 108 (de-
scribing standby letters of credit as a "back-up").
228. For a fuller explanation of the standby letter of credit, see supra note 148.
229. See Rapson, supra note 160, at 267. Indeed, the ABA Task Force noted that
there were no organized trade groups for letter of credit applicants and beneficiaries
in the United States. See Task Force Report, supra note 161, at xvi.
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By contrast, letter of credit issuers are relatively homoge-
neous; banks issue most letters of credit."O Moreover, there
are many banking associations worldwide, including the United
States Council on International Banking, Inc. (USCIB), which
represents more than 530 banks throughout the United
States. 31 In addition to issuers, beneficiaries and applicants,
the letter of credit world boasts a cast of supporting characters,
such as insurance and transportation companies, who generate
the insurance policies, bills of lading, and other documents that
beneficiaries must present in order to receive payment.232
Within each supporting industry, companies may have their own
practices, forms, and voluntary associations.
Applying the general theory of commercial law developed in
this Article to the letter of credit realm thus described, the fol-
lowing theoretical paradigm emerges. Imagine thousands upon
thousands of letters of credit negotiated, presented, and paid
over many years. As applicants, beneficiaries, and issuers learn
which operations are most efficient, they exercise their liberty to
bargain over letter of credit terms. Over time, these terms gen-
erate patterns of conduct that come to be recognized and adopt-
ed as letter of credit practices. Letter of credit practices reflect
choices made by countless individuals, whether acting alone or
in association with others in bank or corporate form. 3 These
practices may endure for some time, or evolve further as chang-
es in the business world precipitate renewed bargaining over
terms. Therefore, when revised Article 5 incorporates letter of
credit practice, the law honors the exercise of individual liberty,
past, present, and future.
To what extent does reality mirror-or diverge from-this
theoretical paradigm?
As a preliminary challenge, some critics might argue that
230. See Rapson, supra note 160, at 267.
231. See Task Force Report, supra note 161, at 1536.
232. See JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT %1 1.01, 1.07 (2d ed.
1991); HENRY HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 56-69 (5th ed. 1974).
233. As explained above, even though banks and other corporations may not have
natural rights of their own, they can be viewed as associations of individuals who
enjoy liberty and property. For a more complete explication of this view, see supra
text accompanying notes 72-74.
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letter of credit practices cannot reflect the free choices of individ-
uals who own and operate banks, given the extensive regulation
that banks generally endure.234 This argument proves too
much. Even if banks are regulated, it does not follow that indi-
viduals associated with banks have had no free choices in devel-
oping the operational practices incorporated in revised Article 5.
Indeed, a survey of federal law reveals primarily a concern with
the effect that outstanding letters of credit have on a bank's
lending limits,235 capital ratios,236 and insolvency."
More significantly, the paradigm could be criticized for its as-
sumption that banks (as issuers) and businesses (as beneficiaries
and applicants) play equal roles in developing letter of credit
practices.s' Indeed, the reality is somewhat more complex. As
issuers, banks primarily are responsible for letter of credit opera-
tions, which include everything from advising the terms of the
credit, to determining documentary compliance and making pay-
ment.239 As providers of letter of credit services, banks are best
situated to play a proactive role, developing and offering credits
on terms that facilitate efficient operation.24 Over time, these
bank-generated terms can evolve into letter of credit practices.
Buoyed by their superior organization and key role in letter of
credit operations, banks have emerged as the primary force be-
234. For examples of the ways in which banks are regulated, see infra notes 235-
37 and accompanying text.
235. For example, the National Bank Act establishes the maximum dollar amount
of loans that a nationally chartered bank can loan to a single entity. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 84 (1994). Standby letters of credit must be counted towards the maximum. See
DOLAN, supra note 232, 12.04[1].
236. In recent years, the Federal Reserve Board, Comptroller of Currency, and
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have issued regulations that require banks to
count both standby and commercial letters of credits as loans when computing their
capital ratios. See DOLAN, supra note 232, 12.03[3].
237. For example, the National Bank Act regulates the distribution of assets
when national banks become insolvent, including payment of outstanding letters of
credit. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 91, 194 (1994); see generally DOLAN, supra note 232, 12.02
(discussing rules that have arisen to deal with bank insolvencies).
238. See generally James E. Byrne, Preamble to Task Force Report, supra note
161, at 1536 (recognizing a need to attempt to solicit input on the UCC from trade
groups or businesses).
239. See id.
240. See id. (explaining that banks are in the position of fair brokers because
they play continuous and multiple roles).
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hind the articulation of letter of credit practices, particularly in
the UCP, which represents the "understandings and practices of
internationally active bank [letter of credit] departments on a
worldwide basis.""' Not surprisingly, when the time came to
restate letter of credit practices in the form of the UCP 500, the
task fell primarily to banking association representatives, in-
cluding a USCIB representative, who served on the Internation-
al Chamber of Commerce's Commission on Banking Practice and
Technique. 2
Banks have taken the lead in fashioning and articulating let-
ter of credit practices, not only because they have the power and
organization to do so, but because they generally are perceived
as being "fair brokers" as far as letter of credit issues are con-
cerned.' Banks often play multiple roles within letter of cred-
it transactions, serving not only as issuers, but applicants and
beneficiaries as well.' Moreover, banks have a general inter-
est in maintaining the viability of the products and services that
they sell, including letters of credit. 5 For both these reasons,
banks have an incentive to promote practices that are fair to
applicants and beneficiaries and that ensure the letter of credit
offers a good value for its price." s
Even though banks have taken the lead, other beneficiaries
and applicants still can play a significant, albeit less direct, role
in the development of letter of credit practices. The letter of
credit is a mercantile device used to facilitate commercial, rather
than consumer, transactions. 7 Beneficiaries and applicants
are businesspersons who presumably have the financial incen-
tive and means to educate themselves regarding the effect of
letter of credit terms. When banks, as issuers, offer letters of
241. Rapson, supra note 160, at 272 (quoting USCIB STUDY OF FUNDAMENTAL PROB-
LFmS WITH THE SEVENTH DRAFT (MARCH 31, 1993) REVISION OF UCC ARTICLE 5).
242. See UCP 500 & 400 COMPARED, supra note 172, at ix. Banks have also
played a major role in the Article 5 revision process, working in the absence of any
identifiable interest groups representing applicants or beneficiaries. See Rapson, su-
pra note 160, at 267-68.
243. See Byrne, supra note 238, at 1536.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See DOLAN, supra note 232, 9 6.02.
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credit on specific terms, beneficiaries and applicants are free to
accept or reject those terms and bargain for other, more favor-
able, terms. In this manner, beneficiaries and applicants can
indirectly influence the development of letter of credit practices,
even if they do not originate those practices.
Some might argue that beneficiaries and applicants do not
have the knowledge or bargaining power necessary to make free
choices regarding letter of credit terms.248 For example, one
commentator has asserted that businesspersons routinely re-
ceive and accept letters of credit without consulting attorneys,
and without ever realizing that the boilerplate incorporates the
UCP 500." Beneficiaries and applicants who have enough
money and power to use letters of credit in multi-million dollar
transactions, however, do have a reasonable opportunity to hire
lawyers250 and to educate themselves regarding the effect of
credit terms. Moreover, even though most letters of credit incor-
porate the entire UCP 500 through boilerplate language,25'
beneficiaries and applicants can bargain with issuers for any
specific terms that are necessary to accommodate the circum-
stances of their specific transactions. If issuers will not bargain,
beneficiaries and applicants can restructure their transactions to
eliminate letters of credit. Bonds and guarantees can substitute
for standby letters of credit, and payment can be effected via
electronic wire transfer, rather than through the use of commer-
cial letter of credit. 52 Given these opportunities, it is fair to
248. See Rapson, supra note 160, at 272-73.
249. See id.
250. Of course, businesspersons should be careful to select a lawyer who specializ-
es in commercial transactions, and understands the basics of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. See Kerry L. Macintosh, We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us, 26 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 673, 678 (1993).
251. See Rapson, supra note 160, at 273.
252. Admittedly, these and other alternatives sometimes may create problems that
letters of credit could have ameliorated. For example, suppose Seller ships goods,
and then, acting through a collecting bank, presents a demand for payment along
with shipping documents to Buyer. To obtain the documents necessary to pick up
the goods, Buyer must make payment, perhaps via electronic wire transfer. The
disadvantage of this transactional structure is that Seller must trust Buyer to make
payment. A commercial letter of credit would have solved the problem by substitut-
ing the commitment of a solvent financial institution. There may, however, be anoth-
er solution. As informational networks continue to expand beyond national bound-
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say that beneficiaries or applicants who accept letters of credit,
even those who act without reading 53 or bargaining over
terms, have exercised their freedom to choose the resulting
terms.
Specific default rules can illustrate this general analysis.
Revised Article 5, for example, now provides that an issuer must
honor a presentation that strictly complies with the terms and
conditions of the letter of credit; compliance is determined by the
standard practice of financial institutions that regularly issue
letters of credit."4 As the formulation "standard practice of fi-
nancial institutions"25 suggests, banks likely will take the lead
in fashioning the specific, detailed practices that determine docu-
mentary compliance. Aside from the international practices
enshrined in the UCP, however, the "standard practice of finan-
cial institutions" is not etched in stone; indeed, there are fre-
quent disagreements among banks, even those within the same
geographical region.3 6 Such disagreements create an opportu-
nity for beneficiaries and applicants to shop among issuers
based on their varying standards. Thus, market forces should
ensure that beneficiaries and applicants influence the evolution
of specific practices.
More importantly, the very custom of judging documentary
compliance by the standard practice of financial institutions is
itself the product of beneficiary and applicant choice. The draft-
ers of the UCP 500 articulated this new compliance standard
aries, sellers can deal with buyers who have established international credit reputa-
tions. Indeed, if enough sellers and buyers become dissatisfied with letters of credit,
the development of such informational alternatives could accelerate. The message for
banks is clear: Businesspersons engaged in multi-million dollar transactions can be
expected to exercise their commercial freedom, one way or another. If
businesspersons view letter of credit terms as being unfair and unalterable, the
market will generate alternatives to letters of credit.
253. It is instructive to note that failure to read a contract does not vitiate con-
sent. See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26 (2d ed. 1990).
254. See U.C.C. § 5-108(a), (e) (1995).
255. See id. § 5-108(e) (emphasis added).
256. See Kozolchyk, supra note 212, at 75. In an effort to achieve greater consis-
tency, the USCIB has been working to compile "white books of documentary practice"
that would establish national standards of document examination. See id. at 75-76.
Even if these white books help to standardize practice, however, they likely will never
eliminate entirely disagreements among issues regarding documentary compliance.
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because they believed that the mirror image rule was dysfunc-
tional, generating costly litigation and uncertainty. 7 The new
standard is meant to restore the trust of businesspersons, 8
who otherwise might abandon the letter of credit and choose
other, more reliable payment systems."9 In other words, the
freedom and bargaining power of individual beneficiaries and
applicants helped to shape the new compliance standard. By
adopting the same standard, the drafters of revised Article 5
demonstrated their respect for the liberty of beneficiaries and
applicants, as well as for issuers.
One last point: What happens when practice-based rules do
not meet the needs of a particular transaction? Revised Article 5
gives beneficiaries and applicants freedom of contract.260 To
continue with the same example, even though the Code now
determines documentary compliance by the standard practice of
financial institutions, the parties to a letter of credit can over-
ride undesirable practices by agreement or course of dealing.261
By granting freedom of contract, revised Article 5 further rein-
forces and strengthens the liberty of letter of credit participants.
E. Summary
To summarize, revised Article 5 is heavily based on letter of
credit practices, particularly as embodied in the UCP. To justify
this foundation, the drafters have emphasized the need to en-
sure operational efficiency of letters of credit. The decision to
codify practice can be justified on another, independent, ground,
as discussed in the preceding Part of this Article. Letter of credit
practices evolve when individuals use their freedom to structure
letter of credit transactions. Banks (and the individuals associat-
ed with them) play a dominant role in originating and articulat-
ing letter of credit practices; however, beneficiaries and appli-
cants usually have enough sophistication and bargaining power
to shape practices indirectly. By adopting these market-generat-
257. See UCP 500 & 400 COMPARED, supra note 172, at 39.
258. See id. at 49.
259. See supra text accompanying note 252.
260. See supra note 175.
261. See U.C.O. § 5-108 cmt. 8 (1995).
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ed practices, revised Article 5 respects the individual liberty of
letter of credit issuers, beneficiaries, and applicants alike.
V. ARTICLES THREE AND FOUR: PAYMENT SYSTEMS
Article 3 on Negotiable Instruments and Article 4 on Bank
Deposits and Collection were revised in 1990.262 Like revised
Article 5, revised Articles 3 and 4 have a strong banking orienta-
tion, frequently incorporating provisions that are based on bank-
ing practices.26a Unlike revised Article 5, however, revised Arti-
cles 3 and 4 have drawn fire, particularly from consumer
advocates.2"
To date, much of the battle over revised Articles 3 and 4 has
taken place on economic turf. The drafters have fired off efficien-
cy rationales in support of the revisions,265 and opponents have
shot back with their own competing economic analyses.
266
This economic controversy is outlined briefly below in order to
contrast its theoretical underpinnings with this Article's theory,
which asks a very different question: Can revisions that are
based on banking practices be justified on liberty grounds? This
Part concludes that the revisions to Articles 3 and 4 pose the
strongest challenge to the thesis that a practice-based Code
respects individual liberty.
A. Historical Background
The revisions to Articles 3 and 4 are easier to understand if
placed in their historical context. Unlike original Article 5,
which represented the first codification of letter of credit law,
original Articles 3 and 4 were based on two prior uniform
laws.267 Charged with the task of drafting Article 3, William
Prosser26 produced a statute that eschewed innovation in fa-
262. See Rubin, supra note 7, at 780.
263. See Rubin, supra note 12, at 557-60.
264. See infra notes 292-97 and accompanying text.
265. See, e.g., FRED H. MILLER, ANALYSIS OF NEW UCC ARTICLES 3 & 4, ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: THE EMERGED AND EMERGING NEW UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
17, 40-45 (1992).
266. See Rubin, supra note 12, at 561-70.
267. See id. at 552-56.
268. William Prosser was a famous law professor and author in the area of torts. See
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vor of refining doctrines already prescribed in the Negotiable
Instruments Law, a uniform act promulgated in 1896 and adopt-
ed in every state."9 Meanwhile, Fairfax Leary 7 ° became the
first person assigned to draft Article 4. His innovative draft,
which attempted to balance industry needs with consumer inter-
ests, provoked wholesale rebellion by banking interests, who de-
manded that Article 4 be eliminated.27' The Leary effort quick-
ly was withdrawn, and bankers were enlisted to help draft a
new version of Article 4. This version was heavily based on the
Bank Collection Code,272 an earlier uniform law drafted by the
American Bankers Association that had met with limited suc-
cess." 3 Some scholars attacked the new law as "an unfair piece
of class legislation"274 that favored banks at the expense of cus-
tomers."5 Nevertheless, Article 4 was adopted by all fifty
states.2 76
Based on prior uniform acts, Articles 3 and 4 were never on
the cutting edge of law or technology, even when first offered for
enactment during the 1950s.277 As the decades flew by, Articles
3 and 4 became ever more antiquated, especially when contrast-
ed with developing check-collection technologies and entirely
new payment systems, such as credit cards and electronic fund
transfers.27
Not surprisingly, by the late 1970s, the ALI decided that Ar-
WILLIAM PROSSER & WLLIAM KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS xix (5th ed. 1984). His exper-
tise in the area of commercial law was limited. See Rubin, supra note 12, at 553.
269. See Rubin, supra note 12, at 552-53.
270. Fairfax Leary served as a professor of commercial law for many years. Mov-
ing tributes to his work appeared in a recent symposium on revised Articles 3 and
4, and new Article 4A. See Patricia B. Fry, An Ecologist for Commercial Law, 42
ALA. L. REV. 351 (1991); Homer Kripke, Dedication, 42 ALA. L. REV. 356 (1991).
271. See Rubin, supra note 12, at 555.
272. See id.
273. When the drafting process for the Uniform Commercial Code began, the
Bank Collection Code had been adopted by only 19 states. See id.
274. Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not
Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 335 (1952).
275. See id.; Grant Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor
Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364, 374 (1952).
276. See Patchel, supra note 7, at 105; Rubin, supra note 12, at 556.
277. See Rubin, supra note 12, at 552-55.
278. See id. at 557-58.
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ticles 3 and 4 must be revised.279 An ambitious New Payments
Code was drafted to bring all payment systems-checks, credit
cards, and electronic funds transfers-under one statutory um-
brella.28 Recognizing that credit cards and electronic funds
transfers already were governed by federal consumer protection
legislation,28' the law extended consumer protection to the
checking system.282 Bankers objected loudly, as did consumer
advocates who believed that the draft had diluted existing pro-
tection for credit card transactions.28 The controversial con-
sumer provisions were removed, but opposition to the New Pay-
ments Code continued, eventually causing the ALI to terminate
the entire project."
Chastened by this traumatic experience, in 1985, NCCUSL
and the ALI launched two new law reform projects: the revision
of Articles 3 and 4 and the creation of an entirely new Article 4A
to regulate wholesale wire transfers. 5 This time, the drafters
had only modest goals: While preserving existing terminology
and structure, the Article 3 and 4 revisions would clear up con-
flicting interpretations and incorporate substantive changes, as
necessary, to account for technological developments and chang-
es in business practices. 6 For the most part, this limited
agenda was honored. True, the provisions of Article 3 were en-
tirely rewritten, rearranged, and renumbered, but for a limited
purpose: to modernize and clarify statutory language.287 As for
Article 4, some important changes were made to accommodate
279. See id.
280. See id. at 557.
281. In 1970 and 1974, Congress amended the Truth in Lending Act to add con-
sumer protection provisions governing credit cards. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1642-44,
1666(i) (1994). In 1978, Congress enacted another piece of consumer protection legis-
lation to govern electronic funds transfers, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act. See
Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3728 (1978) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-
1693(r) (1994)).
282. See Rubin, supra note 12, at 557-58.
283. See id.
284. See Fred H. Miller, U.C.C. Articles 3, 4 and 4A. A Study in Process and
Scope, 42 ALA. L. REV. 405, 408-09 (1991).
285. See William D. Warren, UCC Drafting: Method and Message, 26 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 811, 813 (1993).
286. See Miller, supra note 284, at 409-10.
287. See id. at 412.
1997] 1523
WImLLM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1465
developing technology, particularly in the area of bank-customer
relationships.288 Other than authorizing check truncation, 9
however, the drafters left the check-collection process virtually
untouched. Because the Expedited Funds Availability Act290 pre-
empts state law on many check-collection issues,291 much of
revised Article 4 is now a dead letter.
In the drafters' haste to avoid controversy, they made one
nearly-fatal error. Despairing of finding agreement on the "con-
sumer agenda," the drafting committee decided not to rework
the Code from the consumer perspective.2  Consumer advo-
cates and sympathizers who were involved in the revision pro-
ject argued that the Article 3 and 4 revisions perpetuated and
exacerbated the anti-consumer bias of the original Code.
Their critique developed late in the drafting process, however,
and did not flower until the ALI and NCCUSL already had pro-
mulgated the revisions. 4 Those who were unhappy with the
perceived anticonsumer bias tried to persuade state legislatures
to reject revised Articles 3 and 4.295 Perhaps the most serious
challenge came from Professor Edward Rubin, who had partici-
pated in the drafting process as Chair of the American Bar Asso-
ciation subcommittee assigned to review the Article 3 and 4 revi-
288. For examples of these changes, see infra text accompanying notes 306-38.
289. See infra note 331.
290. In 1987, Congress enacted the Expedited Funds Availability Act, Pub. L. No.
100-86, 101 Stat. 635 (1987) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1994)),
which the Federal Reserve Board has implemented through Regulation CC. 12 C.F.R.
pt. 229 (1996). The Expedited Funds Availability Act requires banks to release de-
posited funds in accordance with specified timetables. See id. §§ 229.10-.13. The Act
also regulates the check-collection process in order to facilitate quick release of
funds. See id. §§ 229.30-.42. For example, banks must give final credits during for-
ward collection, see id. § 229.36(d), so that bounced checks can be returned expedi-
tiously to depositary banks. See id. § 229.31.
291. The Expedited Funds Availability Act and Regulation CC supersede inconsistent
state law, including the Uniform Commercial Code. See 12 U.S.C. § 4007(b) (1994).
292. See Warren, supra note 285, at 820-21.
293. For a sampling of their views, see Hillebrand, supra note 7, at 717-19, and
Rubin, supra note 12, at 592.
294. See Warren, supra note 285, at 819-20. Since then, scholars have argued
that the drafters should consciously try to involve consumer representatives earlier
in the drafting process. See, e.g., Patchel, supra note 7, at 126-45, 156-57; Rubin, su-
pra note 7, at 759-67, 781-87.
295. See Rubin, supra note 7, at 782-87.
1524
LIBERTY, TRADE, AND UCC
sions.296 Concerned that the revisions did not adequately ac-
count for consumer needs, Professor Rubin ultimately resigned
as Chair of the subcommittee and campaigned against revised
Articles 3 and 4 in California and other states. 7 If California
had rejected the revisions, many other states might have fol-
lowed suit. In the end, however, the Article 3 and 4 revisions
were adopted by nearly all fifty states. 8
B. Revised Articles 3 and 4 and Checking Account Practices
As elsewhere within the Code, freedom of contract is an im-
portant foundational principle for revised Articles 3 and 4. Re-
vised Article 4 expressly authorizes parties to vary the effect of
its default provisions by agreement. 9 Similarly, the effect of
Article 3 provisions can be varied by agreement, except where
the Code provides otherwise .3 " Although few provisions in Ar-
ticle 3 expressly permit variation by agreement,' the absence
of such language does not imply that the effect of other provi-
sions may not be varied by agreement.0 2
Absent agreement otherwise, the default rules found within
revised Articles 3 and 4 bind the parties. Many of these rules
are based on checking account practices. Although not every
parallel between law and practice can be documented here, a
few key examples are helpful to the analysis. 33
296. See id. at 743-44.
297. For a more complete and highly personal account of Professor Rubin's in-
volvement in the revision process, see Rubin, supra note 7.
298. See supra note 2.
299. See U.C.C. § 4-103(1) (1995). A bank cannot disclaim its obligations to act in
good faith and exercise ordinary care, nor may it limit damages if it fails to meet
these obligations. See id. The paties, however, can agree on standards for determin-
ing whether the bank has met its obligations, so long as those standards are not
manifestly unreasonable. See id.
300. See id. § 1-102(3).
301. See id. §§ 3-107, 3-112, 3-116, 3-117, 3-203(c), 3-310(a).
302. See id. § 1-102(4).
303. Many other Article 3 and 4 provisions are based on practice. For example,
variable interest rates commonly were employed by lenders as a hedge against infla-
tion during the 1980s. To accommodate this practice, revised Article 3 authorizes
variable rates, see id. § 3-112, thereby overturning prior decisions holding that notes
with variable interest rates were not negotiable. See, e.g., Desmond v. FDIC, 798 F.
Supp. 829, 840 (D. Mass. 1992); In re Gas Reclamation, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1094,
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First, consider the example of the postdated check. Under
original Article 4, customers could defer having their accounts
charged by postdating their checks.0 4 If a payor bank wrong-
fully paid a check before the postdate, thereby causing other
checks to bounce, the bank was liable to its customer for wrong-
ful dishonor."0 5 Revised Article 4 reverses this outcome, ex-
pressly providing that a bank may charge a postdated check
against the customer's account."0 6 To prevent such payment,
the customer must take the initiative, giving the bank a special
notice of the postdating that describes the check with reasonable
certainty.0 7 Only when the bank wrongfully ignores such a
special notice are damages for wrongful dishonor of other items
available.0 8 Comments reveal that this new rule is consistent
with existing practice. Because automated check processing
systems cannot easily identify postdated checks, banks usually
pay checks without respect to their dates.0 9
Second, consider the example of check fraud. Under the origi-
nal Code, a forged check 10 could not be charged against the
customer's account, because it was not properly payable.313
Thus, if a payor bank failed to catch the forgery and paid the
check, it took the loss.1 2 In theory, customer negligence shifted
1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
The wrongful dishonor statute further illustrates the influence of practice. As a
general rule, banks check account balances only once before bouncing checks. To val-
idate this existing practice, the Code now provides that a payor bank may determine
whether funds are sufficient to cover a check any time between receipt of the check
and dishonor, but the bank need only make the determination once. See U.C.C. § 4-
402(c) & cmt. 4 (1995). Once the account balance has been determined, the bank can
dishonor without worrying about whether sufficient funds later come into the ac-
count. See id.
304. See U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 3 (1995).
305. For a discussion of the effects of prior law, see id.
306. See id. § 4-401(c).
307. See id.
308. See id.
309. See id. cmt. 3.
310. In this Article, the term "forged check" refers to a check bearing the forged
signature of the drawer. Forged payee indorsements are subject to different rules.
See U.C.C. § 3-405(2) (1995).
311. See U.C.C. § 4-401(1) (1989); First Nat'l Bank v. Hovey, 412 N.E.2d 889, 893
(Mass. App. Ct. 1980).
312. See Hovey, 412 N.E.2d at 893. The payor bank could not shift the loss to
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the loss back to the customer, but only if the bank paid the
forged check in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
commercial standards. 1' Reasonable commercial standards re-
quired banks to compare checks against signature cards, 14 a
practice that has long since been abandoned as impractical in
the context of automated check processing.31 Therefore, de-
spite customer negligence, most forged check losses fell on
banks. Banks chafed under the perceived unfairness of this
outcome,3 1 6 reasoning that they should not be branded as un-
reasonable for adopting automated processes that provided con-
sumers with fast and inexpensive service.
Revised Articles 3 and 4 retain the general rule that payor
banks cannot charge forged checks against the customer's ac-
count."17 Also, as before, an exception shifts the loss to any cus-
prior banks in the collection chain because no presentment warranty had been
breached. See U.C.C. § 3-417(1)(b) (1989). Moreover, even though the payment was
mistaken, it was final and could not be recovered from holders in due course or per-
sons who in good faith changed position in reliance on the payment. See id. § 3-418.
The rule placing forged check losses on drawees dates back to the 18th century.
See Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (KB. 1762). The traditional expla-
nation is that the payor bank is best able to prevent the loss by checking the forged
signature against the customer's signature card. See U.C.C. §§ 3-417 cmt. 4, 3-418
cmt. 1 (1989).
313. See U.C.C. § 3-406 (1989).
314. See, e.g., D & G Equip. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 764 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1985);
Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 527 N.E.2d 354 (ill. App. Ct.
1988); Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank, 676 P.2d 329 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
315. See JAMES V. VERGARI & VIRGINIA V. SHUE, CHECKS, PAYMENTS & ELEC-
TRONIC BANKING 16-17, 290-91 (1986).
316. Cf Rubin, supra note 12, at 567.
317. A payor bank can charge only properly payable items against the customer's
account. See U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (1995). Checks are properly payable only when the
customer has authorized the payment, and the payment does not violate any
agreement between the bank and customer. See id. cmt. 1. Thus, a check bearing a
forged drawer's signature is not properly payable because the customer never autho-
rized payment.
Once saddled with this loss, the payor bank has no claim against an innocent
payee or collecting bank for breach of presentment warranty, see id. §§ 3-417(a)(3),
4-208(a)(3), and- cannot assert a claim for restitution of money paid by mistake
against a person who took the check in good faith and for value, or "who in good
faith changed position in reliance on the payment." Id. § 3-418(c). Thus, the Code
continues to enshrine the basic rule of Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871
(KB. 1762), which places forged check losses on payor banks. See U.C.C. § 3-417
cmt. 3 (1995).
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tomer whose negligence substantially contributes to the making
of the forged signature. 1 If the payor bank, however, also fails
to exercise ordinary care, the loss no longer falls entirely on the
bank; rather, the loss is allocated between the customer and
bank according to their relative fault.319
More importantly, the Code has redefined ordinary care for
businesspersons as requiring the observance of reasonable com-
mercial standards prevailing in the relevant business and geo-
graphical area."' This general principle is noteworthy in and
of itself. Once again, the Code displays a reverence for commer-
cial practice. More specifically, the definition provides:
In the case of a bank that takes an instrument for processing
for collection or payment by automated means, reasonable
commercial standards do not require the bank to examine the
instrument if the failure to examine does not violate the
bank's prescribed procedures and the bank's procedures do
not vary unreasonably from general banking usage not disap-
proved by this Article or Article 4.321
The Code therefore now allows banks to process and pay
checks through automated systems without checking signature
cards. 2 Because a payor bank's failure to check signature
cards no longer amounts to negligence,3 23 many, if not most,
forged check losses will fall entirely on customers.
Once again, the drafters have chosen to validate a practice
related to automated check processing.3" The attitude behind
the new definition is clear: Because payor banks no longer com-
pare checks against signature cards, the law should not require
them to do so. The law imposes only two limits: The payor bank
318. See U.C.C. § 3-406(a) (1995).
319. See id. § 3-406(b).
320. See id. § 3-103(a)(7).
321. Id. An obligation of ordinary care is an immutable rule because it cannot be
disclaimed. See id. § 1-102(3). A bank can, however, along with its customer, estab-
lish standards by which care is measured, so long as the standards are not mani-
festly unreasonable. See id. Thus, a private agreement could establish a standard of
ordinary care that required banks to compare checks with signature cards. To this
extent, section 3-103(a)(7) is a default rule.
322. See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7).
323. See id.
324. See id.
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must act in accordance with its own procedures and do so in a
manner consistent with general banking usage. 25
Last, but not least, consider the example of a customer's obli-
gation to review her account statement. Under the old Code, a
customer had to examine her account statement and accompa-
nying checks carefully, and promptly notify the bank of her
unauthorized signature or any alterations.326 Failure to comply
with these duties precluded the customer from asserting unau-
thorized signatures or alterations against the payor bank,27
unless the payor bank failed to exercise ordinary care in paying
the forged or altered items,32 as by failing to check signature
cards.329 Under this framework, customers were protected in
two significant ways. First, customers received full information,
because account statements were accompanied by paid checks.
Second, even when customers failed to discover and report
wrongdoing, resulting losses were likely to fall on payor banks,
who could be found negligent simply for having used automated
check processing systems that were incapable of comparing
checks against signature cards.33"
Evolving technology and practice have prompted important
changes in this statutory scheme. Some payor banks have imple-
mented check retention plans, saving time and money by retain-
ing paid checks and returning bare account statements to cus-
tomers.3"' To accommodate this practice, revised Article 4 pro-
325. See id.
326. See U.C.C. § 4-406(1) (1989).
327. To benefit from the preclusion, the bank had to prove that it had suffered
loss as a result of the customer's failure to discover and report the problem. See id.
§ 4-406(2)(a). A related provision held the customer responsible for subsequent forg-
eries or alterations committed by the same wrongdoer more than 14 days after the
customer received a statement reflecting the first forgery or alteration. See id. § 4-
406(2)(b).
328. See id. § 4-406(3).
329. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
330. See U.C.C. § 4-406 (1989).
331. See Rubin, supra note 12, at 574. The drafters have been tantalized by vi-
sions of a more radical form of check truncation, whereby depositary banks would
present checks to payor banks via the transmission of electronic data. In an effort to
facilitate the development of radical check truncation, revised Article 4 recognizes
that agreements, clearing-house rules, and Federal Reserve regulations may provide
that checks can be presented by transmission of electronic images or data, rather
than by delivery of the actual checks. See U.C.C. § 4-110(a) (1995). To accommodate
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vides that a bank either must return paid checks with the ac-
count statement, or provide the customer with sufficient infor-
mation to allow her to reasonably identify paid checks." 2 The
Code does provide a safe harbor: Information is sufficient when
the bank describes checks by number, amount, and date of pay-
ment."'3 The drafters chose this safe harbor because it is consis-
tent with existing technology and practice: Computers already
can recover the check number, amount, and date of payment.
3 4
Faced with this limited information, the customer still must
review her statement in order to determine whether any pay-
ment was not authorized because her signature was unautho-
rized, or the item was altered. If, based on the information pro-
vided, she reasonably should have discovered an unauthorized
payment, then she must notify the bank promptly.3 5 The rules
such agreements, revised Article 4 provides that presentment is made when the elec-
tronic presentment notice is received, and further stipulates that the electronic notice
is the equivalent of an item or check in Code terminology. See id. § 4-110(b), (c).
The purpose of these minimal amendments is to clarify that the Code does not pro-
hibit electronic presentment. See id. cmt. 3.
332. Once check retention is implemented, customers who need checks to establish
tax deductions or other claims must give banks a reasonable time either to return
originals or send legible copies, at whatever cost to the customer the bank chooses
within the boundaries of conscionability and good faith. See id. § 4-402(b) cmt. 3.
333. See id. § 4-406(a).
334. Computers can recover this information with the aid of Magnetic Ink Character
Recognition (MICR). When checks are printed, payor banks add numbers, printed in
magnetic ink, that identify the payor bank, account number, and item number. When a
check is deposited, the depositary bank encodes the amount of the check on the bottom
right-hand side, also in magnetic ink. See Rubin, supra note 7, at 757 n.43.
Customers, however, are left without other, critical information, such as the
date of issue and payee name. Comments explain this reduction in service as neces-
sary in order to make check retention plans feasible. Date of issue and payee name
can be recovered only through expensive and time-consuming physical examination.
See U.C.C. § 4-406 cmt. 1 (1995).
The comments note that technological advances such as image processing may
allow banks to give customers more information in the future, in a manner that is
consistent with automation or check retention systems. Thus, if and when technology
and practice change, the Permanent Editorial Board stands ready to conform the law
accordingly. See id.
335. See id. § 4-406(c). Comments note that exceptional circumstances may exist if
the customer cannot discover forgeries or alterations. The example given assumes
that a wrongdoer has altered the name of the payee; without return of the original
item or a statement listing payee names, the customer would have a difficult time
detecting this type of fraud. See id. § 4-406 cmt. 1. Thus, the comments tacitly
admit that the safe harbor rule provides such limited information that the
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governing preclusion, however, have changed. If the customer
and payor bank are both negligent, they must share losses in
proportion to their fault.36 More importantly, the payor bank
is presumed to have acted reasonably in paying checks through
automated processes without comparing signature cards.33 A
customer who negligently fails to discover and report an alter-
ation or forgery is therefore likely to bear any loss that re-
sults. 3
38
C. Efficiency
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the drafters have
adopted rules that accommodate, and even incorporate, practices
related to automated check processing systems. Why?
Sorting and paying checks through automated processes is
faster and cheaper than sorting and paying checks by hand.3 9
When operating costs drop, banks can pass resulting savings
through to the customers who use the system.40 As a general
rule, automated systems therefore are economically efficient,
because they impose fewer transaction costs on payments.341
Legal rules that are sensitive to the needs of automated systems
help to ensure the efficiency of the check as a payment device.
Again and again the drafters have made this argument, justi-
fying rules in terms of the efficiency of the check collection
system. 2 Payor banks are authorized to honor checks before
customer's obligation to discover and report may not be triggered.
336. See id. § 4-406(e).
337. Article 4 adopts the same definition of ordinary care given in Article 3, and
discussed supra at notes 320-25. See U.C.C. § 4-104(c) (1995).
338. See id. § 4-406(d)(1). Similarly, the customer is responsible for subsequent
forgeries or alterations committed by the same wrongdoer more than 30 days after
the customer received a statement reflecting the first forgery or alteration. See id. §
4-406(d)(2).
339. See id. § 4-406 cmt. 4.
340. See id. § 4-406 cmt. 1.
341. See generally Rubin, supra note 12, at 561 (discussing elements of efficient
payment markets).
342. For brevity's sake, only three examples are discussed in the text. Others
abound. For example, economic concerns underlie the new statute allowing payor
banks to dishonor checks for insufficient funds, after having checked account bal-
ances only once. See U.C.C. § 4-402(c) (1995). The drafters decided that banks
should not be required to check account balances twice, even though a second look
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their postdates (consistent with existing practice) because auto-
mated check-collection systems cannot accommodate postdated
checks.343 Similarly, banks are authorized to pay checks with-
out looking at signature cards (consistent with existing prac-
tice)344 because automated systems process checks at a lower
cost to all customers. 45 Banks can provide customers with ac-
count statements that include only limited information about
paid checks because that information is available through exist-
ing automated processes. 4 Banks need not engage in expen-
sive manual searches for other information that is already avail-
able to customers who carefully maintain checkbook ledgers. The
comments' reason is that this policy results in less cost to the
check-collection system, and thus, less cost to all customers of
the system. 47
Unfortunately, default rules that are justified on efficiency
grounds always are vulnerable to critics who argue that alterna-
tive rules would be more efficient. Professor Edward Rubin has
strongly criticized the Article 3 and 4 revisions on efficiency
grounds.345 Without repeating his entire analysis, one key ex-
ample can be used to illustrate his views.
Professor Rubin has argued that, "[i]f efficiency is the goal,
these legal rules should be designed to reallocate costs in a
manner that approximates the contract that the parties would
have reached had they possessed the necessary informa-
tion."349 Toward this end, liability for clearly avoidable losses
should fall on the party responsible for the loss, while liability
for other losses should be allocated between the customer and
would allow many checks to be paid, rather than bounced. The reason is that auto-
mated processing cannot distinguish checks that have been presented only once (thus
deserving a second chance), from checks that have been presented twice and must
be bounced. See Rubin, supra note 7, at 758-59.
343. See U.C.C. § 4-401(c) cmt. 3 (1995).
344. See id. § 3-103(a)(7).
345. See id. § 4-406 cmt. 4.
346. See id. § 4-406(a) cmt. 1.
347. See id. § 4-406 cmt. 1.
348. See Rubin, supra note 12; Rubin, supra note 7.
349. Rubin, supra note 12, at 562. This method is consistent with the general ap-
proach that many economists have taken in determining appropriate default rules.
See supra text accompanying notes 9-12.
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financial institution."' 0
More specifically, Professor Rubin argued that the Code's
"fault principle" (which effectively imposes the entire loss from a
forged check on the negligent customer).5 is inconsistent with
these basic economic principles. According to Professor Rubin,
most customers will take adequate precautions against check-
book theft when faced with a small, but meaningful loss (in his
example, a hundred dollars), coupled with the inconvenience of
closing the old checking account and opening a new one.352 Be-
cause carelessness can never be completely eliminated, imposing
any further loss on the customer simply punishes him without
producing a corresponding reduction in loss.353 Instead, the
bulk of the loss should be allocated to payor banks who can use
account fees to spread the loss among all customers using the
system.3"
According to Rubin, "the fault principle deviates from econom-
ic efficiency... by ignoring the role of systematic planning.""'
Banks, not customers, design the check-collection system and
thus are the best situated to develop new technologies that could
reduce check fraud loss. For example, banks are experimenting
with optical scanning devices that ultimately may allow them to
compare checks with signature cards, even within an automated
system.5 Ultimately, under Rubin's analysis, such precautions
may provide the most cost-effective means of loss reduction.357
Comparing revised Articles 3 and 4 with Rubin's arguments,
one realizes that efficiency analysis can produce different opin-
ions regarding choice of default rules. Like Rubin, the drafters
have relied on the basic principle that losses should be allocated
to the least-cost avoider. The "fault principle," which allocates
350. See Rubin, supra note 12, at 564.
351. See id. at 566-67.
352. See id. at 568.
353. See id.
354. See id. at 564. Rubin argued that most people are risk-averse, meaning that
they "will pay small amounts to avoid a small chance of losing a large amount." Id.
at 564-65. The cost of imposing a heavy loss upon one unlucky customer therefore is
greater than the cost of spreading the same loss among all customers. See id.
355. Id. at 568.
356. See id. at 569.
357. See id. at 568-69.
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losses to negligent customers, is just another way to identify the
least-cost avoider. Although Rubin believes that small losses
would adequately deter carelessness in customers, the drafters
have reached a very different conclusion, placing the entire loss
on the negligent customer.
The difference in assessment of payor bank responsibility is
even more striking. In concluding that payor banks are the
least-cost avoiders, Rubin considers future events, including the
development of new technology. By contrast, the drafters have
decided that banks are not least-cost avoiders, because existing
automated processes cannot compare checks with signature
cards. To ensure that banks are not saddled with losses that
they cannot avoid presently, the drafters have added the new
definition of ordinary care.
D. Liberty
Economic analysis has yielded conflict, rather than clear an-
swers regarding appropriate choice of default rules for Articles 3
and 4. It is time to open up the debate over these controversial
revisions and examine other policy considerations. The theoreti-
cal model presented in this Article teaches that business practic-
es can be viewed as the product of countless exercises of individ-
ual liberty, so that codification of business practices becomes a
means of respecting liberty. Can the incorporation of practice-
based default rules within revised Articles 3 and 4 similarly be
justified on liberty grounds?
To begin, those individuals who generate the practices en-
shrined in the revisions to Articles 3 and 4 must be identified.
Because most of the revisions discussed above involve the check-
collection process, it may be helpful to identify the parties in-
volved in a hypothetical checking transaction. Suppose a drawer
writes a check on.his checking account in payment for goods or
services. The drawer may be a consumer, a corporation, or an-
other business entity. The payee (who also can be either a natu-
ral person or a business entity) receives the check and deposits
it in his checking account. The depositary bank forwards the
check, possibly through a series of collecting banks, to the payor
bank, which examines the drawer's account for sufficiency of
funds and either pays or dishonors the check.
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What this hypothetical reveals is that check transactions are
conducted by banks and their customers, who can be either
natural persons or natural persons associated through formal or
informal business entities. Based on their.participation in count-
less transactions, banks identify and implement efficient account
terms and operational practices that allow them to provide
checking services at a good profit. Meanwhile, customers affect
the development of banking practices indirectly, by seeking out
checking services that are fast, cheap, and technologically ad-
vanced. According to this theoretical paradigm, checking account
practices represent the sum of thousands of individual free
choices made by banks and customers alike.
Again, the key question emerges: To what extent does reality
mirror-or diverge from-this theoretical paradigm?
Banks have somewhat less free choice in developing checking
account practices than the model suggests. In 1987, Congress
enacted the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 58 which the
Federal Reserve Board has implemented through Regulation
CC."' Under Regulation CC, depositary banks must release
deposited funds to customers relatively quickly, in accordance
with specified timetables.360 To ensure that depositary banks
can release funds with confidence, Regulation CC imposes dead-
lines upon payor banks for the expeditious return of dishonored
checks to depositary banks.36' Rules like these increase the
358. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 635 (1987) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 4001-4010 (1994)).
359. 12 C.F.R. pt. 229 (1996); see also supra notes 290-91 (describing the opera-
tion of the Expedited Funds Availability Act and Regulation CC).
360. A complete explanation of these complex timetables is beyond the scope of
this Article. Generally, however, when a customer deposits a local check, the deposi-
tary bank must make funds available for withdrawal on the second business day fol-
lowing the banking day on which the funds were deposited. When a customer depos-
its a nonlocal check, the depositary bank must make fumds available for withdrawal
on the fifth business day following the banking day of deposit. See 12 C.F.R. pt.
229.12; see also BARKLEY CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, REGULATION CC: FUNDS AvAIL-
ABILITY AND CHECK COLLECTION 2.02[1] (1988).
361. These regulations are intimidatingly complex, but here is a simplified de-
scription of one method of expeditious return. A two-day rule applies to local checks.
A payor bank must send a returned check in a manner such that the check normal-
ly would be received by the depositary bank no later than 4:00 p.m. of the second
business day following the banking day on which the check was presented to the
payor bank. A four-day rule applies to nonlocal checks. The payor bank must send a
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pressure on depositary and payor banks to process checks as
quickly as possible, thereby increasing the need for banks to
adopt the fastest possible automated systems and complemen-
tary practices. In this manner, Regulation CC narrows, but does
not entirely eliminate, the choices that owners and operators of
banks may make. Liberty remains a valid policy objective sup-
porting the legitimacy of banking practice, but its importance is
somewhat blunted within the regulated world that banks must
occupy. 62
More significantly, banks and customers do not play equal
roles in the development of banking practices. As the providers
of checking services, banks necessarily take the lead in develop-
ing and managing their own products. Banks employ bankers,
economists, lawyers, and other technicians who evaluate check-
ing services and the current state of technology, and recommend
cost-effective strategies for operating those services. Granted,
customers can influence checking account practices indirectly, by
choosing services that employ efficient practices. As a group,
customers have enormous purchasing power, and thus, would
seem to have a significant opportunity to affect the contour of
checking account practices. Unfortunately, many checking ac-
count customers are consumers, who, as individuals, lack reason-
able opportunity to make free choices regarding practices.6
The problems consumers face are twofold. First, most consum-
er account holders do not understand the details of check pro-
cessing and its related technology, making it hard for them to
choose among competing checking account services (and associ-
ated practices) on those specific grounds."a Moreover, unlike
letter of credit beneficiaries and applicants, consumers do not
have the financial incentive and means with which to hire a spe-
returned check in a manner such that the check normally would be received by the
depositary bank no later than 4:00 p.m. of the fourth business day following the
banking day of presentment. See 12 C.F.R. § 229.30(a)(1) (1996).
362. The foregoing reasoning merely assesses the role that liberty plays within
the context of existing regulation. This analysis does not imply any normative
judgment that the liberty interests of individuals associated with banks are appropri-
ately subordinated to whatever policies support Regulation CC, or any other banking
regulation.
363. See Rubin, supra note 12, at 561-62.
364. See infra notes 365-70 and accompanying text.
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cialist to explain check processing and related practices to
them.3
65
Of course, consumers should tend to prefer account services
that cost the least and make funds available most rapidly. Be-
cause automated check collection is inexpensive and fast, a pref-
erence for low cost and high speed could translate into a prefer-
ence for automated check collection. By selecting account servic-
es that offer automated check collection, consumers could effec-
tively "choose" the practices necessary to automated systems.
Even this surrogate choice may be more theoretical than real.
Consumer advocates allege that consumers do not receive stan-
dardized information about account charges, and thus cannot
effectively comparison-shop.366 To the extent that this allega-
tion is true, consumer choices do not necessarily reflect a prefer-
ence for inexpensive, automated technology.
367
Second, consumers face personal and institutional barriers to
free contracting. As a group, consumers have enormous purchas-
ing power; however, consumers do not bargain as a collective.
Consumers bargain as individuals who have little power and
thus have little choice but to take or leave the terms offered
them by banks. Meanwhile, banks have little incentive to offer
alternatives to their standard account provisions. 66 In the con-
365. Granted, bank clerks do assist consumers in opening checking accounts. It
seems doubtful, however, that the average clerk would have a solid understanding of
automated check processing and associated practices. Moreover, even if clerks do
have such information, consumers may not be sophisticated enough to ask the right
questions. For example, to ask intelligent questions about check processing, a con-
sumer would have to know that automated systems with specific technological limita-
tions were being used.
366. See Hillebrand, supra note 7, at 717-19; Rubin, supra note 12, at 562. Con-
sumer advocates have urged that banks should be required to disclose information
about standard account terms and charges. The Uniform Commercial Code does not
require such disclosure. See Hillebrand, supra note 7, at 717-19; Rubin, supra note
12, at 563.
367. Instead, many consumers likely choose account services based on factors that
do not implicate check processing, like advertising or bank location. The more preva-
lent such irrelevant choices are, the weaker the argument becomes that consumers
have "chosen" automated systems and accompanying practices.
368. Banks sometimes do offer alternative services for alternative prices. For ex-
ample, some banks currently offer truncated checking accounts as a standard service.
See Rubin, supra note 12, at 574. For an additional fee, the bank may send cus-
tomers paid checks together with the account statement as a matter of regular
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text of automated check processing, such alternatives often
would be hopelessly impractical. To function properly, an auto-
mated system must be able to process a high volume of checks,
without having to distinguish among items. Any contract that
required a bank to single out the checks of certain customers for
special treatment (for example, providing comparisons with
signature cards) would undermine the efficiency of the entire
system.
Furthermore, unlike beneficiaries and applicants who can
exercise their liberty by restructuring business transactions to
replace letters of credit with alternative payment systems, con-
sumers cannot easily restructure their personal transactions to
eliminate checks. The prospect of loss or theft makes payment in
cash too risky, especially when the debt is large or the creditor
is located far away. Not everyone qualifies to receive a credit
card and some businesses do not accept them. Electronic funds
transfers allow safe, fast, and reliable payment, but have not yet
supplanted paper checks, perhaps because many people do not
understand and may even fear the underlying technology. In any
event, many electronic funds transfers (for example, ATM with-
drawals, direct deposits and withdrawals, and point-of-sale
transfers) rely upon existing checking accounts."6 9
To illustrate the foregoing analysis, consider the default rules
that allocate losses caused by forged checks. Even though the
revisions adopt the principle of comparative negligence, custom-
ers likely will bear the entire loss of forged checks. This is so
because the new definition of ordinary care absolves payor banks
course. See id. Nothing in the Code, however, requires banks to provide such alter-
native services.
369. This liberty-oriented analysis helps to explain why economic principles have
produced conflicting accounts of the Article 3 and 4 revisions. Many economists
argue that the law should establish default rules that reflect what the parties would
have chosen, if bargaining were costless. See supra text accompanying notes 9-11.
The rule that losses should be allocated to the least-cost avoider is simply one appli-
cation of this basic principle. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 89 n.18. If
checking account practices were truly the product of informed and free choices by
banks and customers alike, such practices would be good proxies for the terms that
the parties would have chosen, and commentators would agree that the Article 3
and 4 revisions were efficient. If banks create checking account practices, and impose
them upon customers, however, then practices are not necessarily good proxies for
efficient laws.
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of negligence by declaring that banks can pay checks without
examining them. This definition is consistent with existing prac-
tice, under which banks pay checks without examining signature
cards. 37
0
Does this practice reflect the free choices of banks and cus-
tomers? Certainly, the practice reflects the needs of automated
check processing systems, which cannot compare checks against
signature cards. Both banks and customers also might be expect-
ed to choose automated check processing, which is faster and
cheaper than processing by hand.
Because the federal government has imposed strict timetables
for the release of deposited funds and the return of dishonored
checks, however, the decision of bank owners and operators to
employ automated check processing systems seems less than
free. More importantly, consumers who hold checking accounts
lack the sophistication and financial resources necessary to in-
vestigate and understand automated check processing and its
concomitant practices. As individuals, consumers also lack the
power necessary to bargain for alternative account terms that
would require banks to compare checks against signature cards.
Therefore, when the Code recognizes the common practice of
paying checks without comparing signature cards, the Code
adopts a default rule that respects the liberty of many banks,
but few consumers.
A final point to consider is whether consumers 371 can pre-
serve their liberty by contracting out of default rules that do not
meet their needs. Revised Article 3 provisions are subject to the
general rule that allows parties to vary the effect of Code provi-
sions by agreement, except where otherwise provided by the
Code. 2 Moreover, revised Article 4 expressly authorizes par-
370. See supra text accompanying notes 320-25.
371. Consumers, and not banks, would benefit most from the freedom to contract
out of Code solutions. As a group, bankers have the legal knowledge and bargaining
power necessary to vary the effect of existing rules. They have little incentive to do
so, however, given that the revisions closely track existing banking practice. Bank
owners and operators already have made the best choices they can, operating within
the limitations imposed by governmental regulation. To further enhance the liberty
of individuals associated with banks, elimination of regulation, and not freedom of
contract, would be necessary.
372. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1995). Code obligations of good faith, diligence, reason-
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ties to vary the effect of its terms by agreement."' 3 As ex-
plained more fully above, however, lack of sophistication and
bargaining power may render this freedom of contract illusory
for most consumers.
E. Summary
In sum, many provisions within revised Articles 3 and 4 draw
their inspiration from checking account practices related to auto-
mated check processing. In support of this foundation, the draft-
ers have argued that these practices are efficient because auto-
mated check processing imposes fewer transaction costs on pay-
ments. Consumer advocates have challenged the revisions, argu-
ing that the drafters have chosen inefficient solutions to common
problems that checking account customers face.
Looking at the problem from a different angle, this Article has
posed the question of whether the Article 3 and 4 revisions can
be justified on liberty grounds. In theory, checking account prac-
tices result from free choices made by banks and their custom-
ers. In reality, banks originate practices, leaving customers to
react through the exercise of their purchasing power. Many of
these customers are consumers who lack the sophistication and
financial resources necessary to learn about automated check-
collection systems and related practices. Moreover, as individu-
als, consumers lack the bargaining power necessary to overcome
established practices and standardized account terms. Because
checking account practices are not the product of meaningful
consumer choice, it is hard to justify the Article 3 and 4 revi-
sions on liberty grounds.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has theorized that business practices emerge as
byproducts when individuals exercise their natural right to liber-
ableness, and care cannot be disclaimed by agreement, but the parties may deter-
mine the standards by which performance of such obligations is measured, so long
as these standards are not manifestly unreasonable. See id. Thus, in theory, a pri-
vate agreement could establish a standard of ordinary care that required banks to
compare checks with signature cards.
373. See id. § 4-103(a).
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ty. Adopted by voluntary trade associations and enforced by
private sanction, such practices could assume a status akin to
law, without the involvement of the state.
Although this theory may seem abstract, it has important
implications for a world in which the state regulates commercial
affairs through legislation. After more than forty years of exis-
tence, the UCC is still going strong. 4 What is the key to its
continuing vitality?
To maintain a healthy commerce, the United States must
have a basic commercial law that is responsive to the needs of
business. Generally, the drafters of the Code have achieved this
goal by adopting legal rules and principles that are based on
business practices. Just as importantly, by selecting practice-
based default rules, the drafters have found a means of respect-
ing the liberty of individuals within the business community,
whose free choices helped to evolve the underlying practices. In
this manner, practice-based rules become a vehicle for resolving
the apparent tension between individual and community.
Moreover, to the extent that any tension remains, the Code
preserves individual liberty by allowing disgruntled parties to
contract out of unfavorable rules. Eventually, if enough individu-
als contract out of a disfavored rule, a new practice will emerge.
The drafters therefore have crafted a Code that is flexible
enough to accommodate changing practices and technology. 75
The recent revision of Article 5 supports my theory that prac-
tice-based default rules can be justified on liberty grounds. The
drafters codified letter of credit practices because they believed
that those practices represented the most efficient means of
operation. Going beyond this economic reasoning, this Article
explained that letter of credit practices are generated when issu-
374. In two recent symposia, academics and practitioners had the chance to as-
sess the vitality of the Code. Although opinions varied, most authors agreed that the
Code should, and would, continue to play a vital role in commercial affairs. See
Symposium, Is the UCC Dead, or Alive and Well? Practitioners' Perspectives, 28 LOY.
LA L. REV. 89 (1994); Symposium, Is the UCC Dead, or Alive and Well?, 26 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 535 (1993).
375. See Miller, supra note 284, at 413 (stating that the ability to change the former
Article 4 by agreement allowed that provision, "promulgated at the beginning of the
machine processing of checks, to survive without... revision for over 30 years").
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ers, beneficiaries, and applicants exercise their freedom to en-
gage in letter of credit transactions. Codification of letter of
credit practices thus respects the liberty of market participants.
Letter of credit users who are dissatisfied with the default rules
provided in revised Article 5 can preserve their freedom by bar-
gaining for alternative terms.
Conversely, the libertarian argument for practice-based de-
fault rules is least persuasive in contexts involving large num-
bers of market participants who lack a reasonable opportunity to
understand or bargain over contract terms. For example, many
checking account customers are consumers who lack the knowl-
edge or bargaining power needed to make meaningful choices
among checking account services and related practices. Revised
Articles 3 and 4, which codify checking account practices, are
therefore hard to justify on liberty grounds. Unfortunately, the
same lack of knowledge and bargaining power makes it difficult
for consumers to preserve their liberty by contracting out of
these default rules.
Given these conclusions, what course should the drafters steer
as they continue to revise the UCC? As a first cut, the drafters
should remain true to their commercial vision and continue to
draft new and revised articles that are based on business prac-
tices. Otherwise, liberty could be undermined within the com-
mercial realm.
At the same time, however, the drafters should recognize that
business practices are not necessarily the best drafting model for
consumer transactions. The drafters should structure future
articles that are flexible enough to allow variation from practice
where necessary to ensure fairness to consumers. In crafting
solutions to consumer problems, the drafters surely will not lack
for inspiration. In the turbulent wake of the Article 3 and 4
revisions, many commentators have urged the drafters to involve
consumer advocates in future projects, from the earliest stages
of the drafting process through the enactment of final legisla-
tion.376 Already, the process of revising Articles 2 and 9 has
shown that consumer advocates are ready and willing to make
376. See, e.g., Patchel, supra note 7, at 126-45, 156-57; Rubin, supra note 7, at
759-67, 781-87.
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suggestions regarding laws that meet consumer needs.3 77 By
giving such suggestions a fair hearing, the drafters can provide
consumers with their last, best hope for shaping the law that
governs them.
377. See Hillebrand, supra note 3; Gail K. Hillebrand, The Revision of UCC Arti-
cle 9: Issues for Consumers, 27 UCC L.J. 179 (1994).
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